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1 .  H A Z A R D  M I T I G A T I O N  P L A N N I N G  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is an emerging consensus in the disaster policy community that, in an age of 
economic uncertainty, environmental degradation and rising disaster losses, hazard mitigation is 
an increasingly important phase of the disaster policy cycle. Hazard mitigation measures are those 
that seek to eliminate or reduce future losses from disasters. While preparedness, response, and 
recovery deal with the immediate realities of disaster losses, only mitigation has the potential to 
reduce future damage, thereby increasing communities’ resilience in the face of natural hazards. As 
such, hazard mitigation policies and programs at all levels of government can have a profound 
influence on the safety and resilience of local communities.   
In the past three decades, social scientists have made considerable progress in their 
understanding of the societal elements of natural hazards and disasters – including dispelling 
myths about public panic in disasters and improving the efficacy of warning, evacuation, and 
emergency communications (NRC, 2006). Despite this growing knowledge base, however, our 
understanding of mitigation policy – of how (and if) federal and state/provincial programs and 
policies generate local capacity and commitment to hazard mitigation – is lacking (May and 
Williams, 1986; May, 1996, NRC 2006). In fact, it is no longer surprising to hear that the perverse 
effects of well-intended government policies have increased the vulnerabilities that they sought to 
diminish. A thorough understanding of hazard mitigation institutions and their interactions at all 
levels of government is essential to the formulation and implementation of sound policies and 
programs that increase, rather than undermine, community resilience (May, 1996, NRC 2006).  
Losses in natural disasters are often exacerbated by policy decisions that place vulnerable 
structures and people in the path of natural hazards. Hazard mitigation plans are policy documents 
intended to guide public decision making in order to reduce these vulnerabilities. Mitigation 
planning is one of the primary mitigation policy tools in the United States1.  According to the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2010b), hazard mitigation plans “create a framework for 
risk-based decision making to reduce damage to lives, property, and the economy from future 
disasters.” The benefits of successful hazard mitigation planning include: fostering hazard 
awareness among the public, staff, and elected officials; guiding growth away from hazardous 
areas; building community capacity for disaster resilience; protecting public health and safety; and 
reducing damage in the event of natural disasters (Burby et al., 1999; Godschalk, 2003).     
Planning, and other mitigation policy tools, are particularly interesting when considered 
comparatively. In the United States, local hazard mitigation planning is federally mandated2. 
                                                             
1 Mitigation planning as a policy tool has gained prominence since the adoption of the Disaster Mitigation Act 
2000, which expanded mitigation planning requirements from the state to the local level.  
2 While it not required by law, FEMA-approved mitigation plans are a prerequisite for state and local access to 
federal emergency funds. 
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Moreover, participatory planning processes are some of the most “extensive and intensive” in the 
world – though participation in mitigation planning is often rather difficult to mobilize (Godschalk 
et al., 2003, 750). In Canada, mitigation planning has been virtually ignored while federal and 
provincial policy focuses on preparedness and response (Henstra et al., 2004; Henstra & McBean, 
2005; Hwacha, 2005). To explore the implications of these policy differences, this paper compares 
hazard mitigation institutions in the United States and Canada, specifically in the province of British 
Columbia and the state of Washington, which have similar hazard exposure, but different policy 
approaches. International comparative analysis is a useful tool in disaster studies because it 
provides a new perspective on familiar institutions, providing insight into policy choices and best 
practices (McEntire and Mathis, 2007). Comparing mitigation institutions and governance 
arrangements in the United States and Canada provides context for understanding local mitigation 
initiatives and disaster outcomes, as well as ways to improve them. For example, do communities in 
the United States implement more, or different, hazard mitigation measures as a result of their 
planning mandates? Are they more resilient? Or are local mitigation projects primarily the result of 
local need and initiative, regardless of federal and state/provincial policy?  I hypothesize that 
stronger, bottom up policy mandates and more financial and technical support institutions in 
Washington will lead to greater planning capacity and policy innovation than in similar 
communities in British Columbia.  
There are three key questions that drive this comparative analysis. First, what are the 
institutions and governance arrangements at the federal and state/provincial levels that affect the 
implementation of hazard mitigation measures at the local level?  Second, do similar communities 
in Washington and British Columbia mitigate hazards differently? Finally, what policy lessons can 
be drawn from these differences or similarities in hazard mitigation implementation? These 
questions are addressed in three parts, at three nested scales. The first section presents a 
comparative literature review on federal hazard mitigation policy in the United States and Canada. 
This section reviews the history of hazard mitigation policy in each country, the shared themes and 
challenges, and the areas of policy divergence at the federal level. The second section describes the 
hazard mitigation institutions and governance arrangements at the state and provincial level. It 
begins by reviewing shared governance arrangements in general, before describing the hazard 
environment, legislation, and programs in British Columbia and Washington, and then 
hypothesizing about the impacts of these governance arrangements on the implementation of 
mitigation measures at the local level. Local implementation is explored in section three.  Case 
studies of two communities in British Columbia and two communities in Washington are presented 
and analyzed covering: hazard exposure; hazard mitigation planning practices; the type and 
number of mitigation tools used; and the degree of political and public support for hazard 
mitigation in each community. Conclusions are then drawn about the impacts of federal and 
state/provincial governance arrangements on local hazard mitigation practices and policy 
recommendations are put forward. 
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1.2 DEFINITION OF HAZARD, DISASTER, MITIGATION  
 A hazard is defined as “a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human 
activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or 
environmental degradation” (UN/ISDR, 2005, 1). While the term hazard encompasses a wide range 
of phenomena, both natural and human-caused, this policy analysis will focus on policy related to 
natural hazards. Granted, it is sometimes overly 
simplistic to distinguish between exclusively 
natural or human-caused disasters. For 
example, the levee failures and flooding after 
Hurricane Katrina are clearly the result of both 
natural and human activities. Moreover, some of 
the policies described herein take an all-hazards 
approach and many mitigation measures are 
effective against both natural and human-
caused hazards.  However, some human-caused 
hazards, particularly terrorism, are mitigated 
through a largely different set of policies and 
institutions that are beyond the scope of this 
paper (See Figure 1).  
In contrast to the “potential” damage of a hazard, a disaster is what happens when hazards 
intersect with social, economic, physical or environmental vulnerabilities, and, more specifically, 
when their impacts overwhelm community capacity to deal with them (Quarantelli, 1986). The 
capacity of a community to deal with hazards is shaped largely by its institutions. Institutions are 
commonly characterized as rules (Ostom, 1986). For the purposes of this review, the rules in 
question are narrowly defined to include federal and state/provincial constitutions and legislation 
as well as major programs and policies that guide mitigation actions and outcomes at lower levels 
of government.  
The definition of the term “hazard mitigation” appears widely agreed upon, rarely straying 
far from the wording of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (1992, 41) definition of hazard 
mitigation as “measures taken in advance of a disaster aimed at decreasing or eliminating its impact 
on society and environment (see Newton, 1997; Godschalk et al., 1999). Some scholars have taken 
exception with the word “eliminate,” pointing out that risk can never be completely eradicated; only 
minimized (Newton, 1997). The definitions of mitigation used by both the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and the Government of Canada reflect this refinement. While FEMA 
(2010) defines mitigation as “the effort to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of 
disasters,” the Canadian report to the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) 
defines it as “long-term actions taken to reduce risk associated with natural disasters3” 
(Government of Canada, 2004, 28).  
                                                             
3 It is interesting to note that this document defines mitigation solely in terms of natural disasters, and not 
human-caused hazards. 
All 
Hazards 
Approach 
Natural 
Hazard 
Mitigation 
Anti-
Terrorism/Law 
Enforcement  
Figure 1. Relationship of Natural to Human-caused Hazard Mitigation  
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Despite this general consensus, official reports make it clear that, for policy purposes, the 
term mitigation has been interpreted quite differently by the governments of Canada and the 
United States (Newton, 1997). Canada appears to interpret what constitutes mitigation in the 
broadest terms, as evidenced by its 2004 report to the UNISDR, which reflects on Canada’s 
accomplishments with regard to disaster risk reduction. Activities cited include the committees and 
programs of a plethora of federal and provincial agencies, many with only a tangential relationship 
to mitigation, usually in the form of overlaps with mandated preparedness activities (Government 
of Canada, 2004). Newton (1997, 223) states that, “in Canada, perceptions of mitigation are diffuse 
and individual, in the absence of any formal policy statement or organizational delivery structure at 
the federal level.4” In the United States, on the other hand, hazard mitigation was clearly defined 
and treated as a cornerstone of emergency management in the 1990s (Haddow, Bullock and 
Coppola, 2008). Since FEMA’s integration into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
however, the definition of mitigation has expanded and become somewhat confused, increasingly 
incorporating terrorism preparedness and prevention activities (Tierney, 2006).  
Hazard mitigation can take many forms, and includes structural and non-structural tools. 
Common non-structural mitigation tools include: hazard identification and mapping, design and 
construction applications (such as building codes), land-use planning, financial incentives, and 
insurance (Haddow, Bullock & Coppola, 2008). Structural controls include flood control 
infrastructure such as flood walls, levees, and dykes, as well as physical alterations such as beach 
nourishment, reinforced safe rooms, and infrastructure flood-proofing and reinforcement. 
Structural controls are widely used and supported by federal policies. However, recent scholarship 
recognizes that these structures often do environmental damage and intensify long-term 
vulnerability, and that non-structural controls, such as land-use planning and education, are more 
conducive to sustainability and resilience (Godschalk et al., 1999; Birkland, 2003; Burby, 2006). 
1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF MITIGATION PLANNING 
Hazard events were long considered “acts of God” and therefore utterly unpredictable and 
unpreventable (Henstra & McBean, 2005). However, as we increase our understanding of the 
technical aspects of natural hazards and their interaction with social and physical vulnerabilities, 
and as the social and economic damage they cause increases, the need to move toward increased 
hazard mitigation is becoming evident (Godschalk et al., 1999; Burby et al., 1999; Pearce, 2003; 
Henstra, 2005). Population growth, as well as migration to and rapid development of hazard areas, 
such as coastal areas in the United States and the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, mean that 
more people and property are at risk than ever (Newton, 1997; Cutter & Emrich, 2005). 
In addition to their significant social and emotional disruptions, the rising economic toll of 
disasters is beginning to put a strain on the insurance industry, as well as the coffers of federal 
government (Newkirk, 2001). In the United States, disaster spending has been rising dramatically 
since 1960, reaching an average of US$20-30 billion per disaster (Cutter & Emrich, 2004, 381; 
Kemp, 2008, 246). In Canada, due to lower overall hazard exposure (exposure being a function, in 
part, of population), disaster payments have seldom exceeded C$1 billion (Kemp, 2008, 246). 
                                                             
4 Canada’s National Disaster Mitigation Strategy was later implemented in 2008. 
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Nevertheless, Canadian disaster losses have been on the rise, estimated to have been doubling 
every five to seven years since 1970 (Henstra et al., 2004, 2).  
Mitigation is gaining currency as the goal of community resilience is increasingly embraced 
at all levels of government (May & Williams, 1986). The concept of resilience is a shift away from 
the earlier focus on disaster resistance, with its emphasis on preparedness and structural 
reinforcements. Instead, resilience focuses on building the physical and social capacity of 
communities, which allows them to adapt and recover (Tierney & Bruneau, 2007). Godschalk et al. 
(1999, 526) define resilient communities as “communities [that] may bend before the extreme 
stresses of natural hazards, but they do not break.” Mitigation can be an important tool for the 
development of resilient communities (Godschalk et al., 1999; Burby, 2006).   
Hazard mitigation plans can be a valuable policy tool for building community capacity and 
resilience. These plans often include the identification of hazard exposure and vulnerability and 
policy recommendations to reduce the likelihood or extent of future damage. Many plans also 
identify parties responsible for implementation and how different stakeholder organizations will 
work together to implement the goals of the plan. Making these connections and responsibilities 
explicit can foster horizontal and vertical coordination and build the relationships, capacity, and 
social capital for a more resilient society. Advance planning and prioritization of mitigation projects 
also means that communities are able to respond more quickly when implementation opportunities 
arise. For example, mitigation is much more likely to be included in a municipal budget or 
integrated into post-disaster recovery if a mitigation plan was already in place. 
There are two types of hazard mitigation plans: stand alone plans, often created by 
municipal or county emergency management agencies; and hazard mitigation elements of 
comprehensive plans, created under the purview of a planning department or commission. Each 
type of plan has its own strengths, but Godschalk et al. (2003), favor the latter approach, as 
incorporating hazard mitigation into a comprehensive plan has the added advantage of integrating 
mitigation across all elements, using land use, transportation, environmental, and other policies to 
simultaneously meet hazard mitigation and other goals. Comprehensive planning also tends to have 
a higher standard for public outreach and participation than stand alone mitigation plans, which 
often have trouble attracting public buy-in (Godschalk et al., 2003; Birkland, 2006).  
Public participation is a critical part of successful hazard mitigation planning. “A sustainable 
community,” says Mileti (1999, 6), “selects mitigation strategies that evolve from full participation 
among all public and private stakeholders. The participatory process itself may be as important as 
the outcome.” Perhaps the most important function of a public hazard mitigation planning process 
is building knowledge and awareness. The planning process can be used to “create a knowledgeable 
constituency of citizens who support hazard mitigation programs,” say Burby et al. (1999, 248), and 
that can be essential for successful implementation.  Without stakeholder buy-in during the 
planning process, the implementation of mitigation policies is more likely to falter at the first sign 
of opposition or shifting priorities (Godschalk et al., 2003). A participatory planning process can 
help identify potential conflicts or road blocks early on, improving the chances of resolving the 
issue or exploring more feasible alternatives. Public input can also be used to select and prioritize 
mitigation projects, ensuring that policy recommendations address the needs and values of the 
community. 
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1.4 METHODS 
Description of Methods  
This comparative analysis combines three qualitative methods: literature review; analysis 
of official documents; and key informant interviews. Section one, “Federal Hazard Mitigation”, is a 
summary and analysis of peer-reviewed literature. Section two, “State and Provincial Institutions”, 
is based on analysis of state mitigation plans5, legislation, and program descriptions, as well as a 
review of relevant literature. State and provincial shared governance arrangements are classified 
according to the four-part typology defined by Berke (1998): full regulatory partnership; 
collaborative partnership; regulatory limited partnership; and mobilization approach.  
Section three, “Local Mitigation Implementation”, presents four community-level case 
studies. One large city (population ~100,000-200,000) and one small city (population ~10,000-
20,000) were selected from both Washington and British Columbia. The cities were selected to be 
comparable matched pairs based on the following criteria: hazard exposure, population, growth 
rate, population density, median income, and economy. The four case study locations are Richmond 
and Port Alberni, B.C., and Everett and Mountlake Terrace, WA. Official documents analyzed for 
each of the four communities include, as applicable: hazard mitigation plans, 
comprehensive/official community plans, emergency response plans, community websites, bylaws, 
relevant literature, and archival data (from the Census and American Community Survey). Because 
comprehensive archival data on mitigation measures is not available, particularly in the British 
Columbia communities, which do not have hazard mitigation plans, archival data was 
supplemented by key informant interviews. 
Approval was obtained from the UNC Institutional Review Board for open-ended telephone 
interviews. Key informants were identified based on their professional responsibilities as the most 
senior emergency management or planning professional6 available in each community. Because 
most of the interview questions relate specifically to the professional knowledge or experience of 
emergency managers, only one interview was conducted in most case study communities, with the 
only exception being Mountlake Terrace, WA.  For this jurisdiction both the local planner 
responsible for mitigation planning and the emergency management coordinator of the regional 
Emergency Services Coordinating Agency (ESCA) were interviewed. For a list of key informants and 
interview questions, see Appendix A. Interviews included two parts: five objective questions about 
mitigation measures planned and implemented in the community; and five subjective questions 
about community support for hazard mitigation. Interviews were recorded and notes were typed 
about each response. Results were verified by emailing each key informant the characterization of 
their mitigation measures (Section 3, Table 3) for their approval. This resulted in the addition of 
some measures that were not mentioned during the interviews. All key informants but one (Procter 
in Richmond) confirmed the findings for their respective case study.  
                                                             
5 Predominantly the Washington State Hazard Mitigation Plan 2010, as British Columbia does not have a 
comprehensive provincial mitigation plan. 
6 Emergency managers were interviewed in the large cities, which have emergency management divisions. In 
the smaller communities, emergency management is included among the duties of the city planner.  
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Responses to the interview questions are combined with archival data to analyze two 
characteristics of local hazard mitigation implementation: community capacity for hazard 
mitigation (not overall capacity) and policy innovation. Community capacity is considered 
qualitatively as a combination of planning/emergency management staff, resources devoted to 
mitigation, mitigation related plans adopted, and perceived political support for mitigation 
proposals.  Successful implementation of mitigation measures is considered more likely when these 
four elements are present. Policy innovation is estimated based on the number of different 
mitigation tools employed. The assumption underlying this indicator is that a community that uses 
more, different tools to address hazard mitigation is addressing locally specific needs that basic 
tools do not address, and that they are going above and beyond federal and state/provincial 
requirements. It is expected that community capacity and policy innovation are related concepts, 
but that the relationship is not necessarily linear.  
 In order to assess these two capabilities, I use interview responses to create summary 
tables of the types of mitigation measures implemented and planned in each community.  
Mitigation measures are classified into fifty five different types of tools that can be divided into ten 
categories: acquisition & elevation; awareness; coordination; development incentives; development 
regulations; financial assistance; preparedness/response; protection of public facilities; recovery 
measures; and structural controls (Berke, Smith & Lyles, under review).  Qualitative analysis of 
responses to subjective questions is used to interpret policy outcomes and support 
recommendations.  
Limitations 
There are two major limitations to this analysis: rough measures of capacity and 
innovation; and imperfectly matching case study communities. The first issue is a result of data 
availability. Because of the diffusion of hazard mitigation projects across multiple departments, 
none of the cities interviewed were able to provide information about local emergency 
management budgets or the amount of grant funding received. As a result, mitigation resources are 
approximated based on whether localities dedicate any of their local budgets to: a) emergency 
management in general and b) mitigation specifically; or whether they relied exclusively on 
external grant funding. Policy innovation is clearly based on more than just the raw number of 
different tools used but, due to data limitations, the number of policy tools was used as a rough 
indicator of innovation. Also, both capacity and innovation measures are based on self-reported 
data, which may be affected by key informant bias or differences in interpretation. While there is 
room for refinement of these measures in future research, they provide the basis for a meaningful 
comparison of case studies in this exploratory policy analysis.  
Second, although the four communities were selected because each international matched 
pair has a relatively similar hazard environment and demographic characteristics, neither of these 
pairs of communities is a perfect match. They differ somewhat in both their hazard and 
demographic characteristics and these factors are likely to influence the mitigation tools that they 
chose to adopt. No two international communities are likely to be alike in every meaningful way. 
We cannot draw causal conclusions from these case studies, because of the differences between the 
matched pairs, the small number of cases, and the many confounding factors not accounted for 
here, such as the presence of local champions and previous experience with disaster. Nevertheless, 
the comparison of these four communities provides insights into our hypotheses about the effects 
of shared governance arrangements on local hazard mitigation.   
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2 .  F E D E R A L  H A Z A R D  M I T I G A T I O N   
2.1 History of Hazard Mitigation in the United States and Canada 
This section begins with an overview of the history and development of hazard mitigation 
institutions in the United States and Canada. Next, the common themes and policy differences 
between the countries are explored. Commonalities include grappling with the safe development 
paradox, shared governance, risk distortion, and how to increase local capacity. National policies 
differ in terms of the political salience of disaster and the degree and nature of federal involvement 
in hazard mitigation. This policy review establishes context for the discussions of state/provincial 
and local policy that follow. It will become evident that federal institutions can have a strong 
influence on hazard mitigation practices at lower levels of government.  
The hazard mitigation policies in the United States and Canada have a lot in common. In 
both countries, early emergency management policies were born of civil defense concerns after 
World War II (Newton, 1997). Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that the federal agencies responsible for 
emergency management have been reorganized frequently in both countries. The figures also 
highlight the role of the defense agencies in emergency management – though these functions were 
separated earlier in the United States (1960) than in Canada (2003). Federal systems in both 
countries divide power constitutionally between the national and sub-national governments. 
Primary responsibility for emergency management is assigned to state and provincial/territorial 
governments, who often devolve responsibility to local governments. On both sides of the border, 
local governments are expected to be the first responders when disaster strikes and are ultimately 
responsible for implementing most mitigation measures, enlisting state or provincial/territorial 
assistance when necessary. When their own resources are strained or exceeded, states and 
provinces/territories can request support from their respective federal government. While the two 
sets of institutions have much in common, their hazard mitigation institutions have developed quite 
differently over the past three decades.  
Figure 2. Organization of Federal Disaster Agencies and Roles in the United States, 1950-2010 (Birkland, 2010, 23) 
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United States 
One of the first federal programs to address hazard mitigation in the United States was the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), adopted by Congress in 1968, and amended in 1973, 
1982, 1994, and most recently by the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004. While insurance itself 
redistributes rather than reducing risk, NFIP set out preconditions for coverage, including flood-
proofing and elevation requirements for properties in federally recognized floodplains, which are 
intended to reduce the risk of disastrous flooding. The Community Rating System, introduced in 
1990, supplements NFIP, encouraging community floodplain management by offering discounts on 
flood insurance to communities that exceed NFIP’s minimum requirements. While NFIP includes a 
hazard mitigation component, however, it is by no means a comprehensive hazard mitigation 
policy. 
The first federal natural hazard mitigation policy was the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121), commonly known as the Stafford Act, and the 
accompanying regulation, Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 206 (44 C.F.R. 206). The 
Stafford Act created a procedure for the presidential declaration of disasters that formalized the 
federal role, in which the governors of affected states must request a declaration and provide 
evidence that the disaster in question exceeds state capacity and federal assistance is required 
(Godschalk et al., 1999). In the case of a presidential disaster declaration, the Stafford Act outlines 
the available federal assistance, including: Public Assistance (section 405), debris removal (sec. 
407), Individual Assistance (sec.408), unemployment assistance (sec. 410), food coupons and 
distribution (sec. 412), legal services (sec. 415), crisis counseling assistance and training (sec 416), 
community disaster loans (sec 417), and emergency public transportation (sec. 419), and funds for 
hazard mitigation (sec. 404). The provision of federal disaster assistance is the responsibility of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  
Hazard mitigation under the Stafford Act employed three main “tools” in the 1990s: Section 404 
mitigation grants, Hazard Mitigation Survey Teams, and Section 409 mitigation plans (Godschalk et 
al., 1999). Section 404 created the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), which provides 
Disaster 
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Figure 3. Organization of Federal Disaster Agencies and Roles in Canada, 1950-2010 (Based on Birkland, 2010, 23) 
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federal matching funds for state and local post-disaster hazard mitigation projects, and is pegged as 
a percentage of total disaster assistance7. Hazard Mitigation Survey Teams include FEMA, state, and 
local actors who gather after a disaster to identify how mitigation actions identified in the state’s 
mitigation plan can best be implemented. State hazard mitigation plans were required under 
Section 409 of the Stafford Act as a condition for receiving FEMA assistance. These plans were 
required to contain: hazard assessments, descriptions of state and local hazard management 
policies and capabilities, hazard mitigation goals, objectives, and strategies, and methods of 
implementation, monitoring, evaluation and updating (Godschalk et al., 1999). Although states 
were encouraged to develop these plans before disaster struck, in reality, most plans were drafted 
after major disasters, in order to qualify for federal assistance (Godschalk et al., 1999). This rushed, 
post-disaster planning concerned scholars like Godschalk et al. (1999, 16), who wrote that, “the 
future challenge is to activate the intergovernmental hazard mitigation policy system ahead of 
disasters – to convert it to a threat-driven process that anticipates disasters in order to carry out 
advance mitigation activities.”  
The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA), which amended the Stafford Act, addressed this 
shortcoming and strengthened the emphasis on local pre-disaster mitigation.  In order to qualify for 
federal disaster assistance, the DMA requires not only state plans, but also, under Section 322, 
FEMA-approved local hazard mitigation plans. The DMA also introduces two categories of state 
plans – Standard and Enhanced, states with Enhanced plans having additional funding 
opportunities. New funding programs created by the DMA include funds for plan development, pre-
disaster mitigation funding (PDM), and two new flood mitigation programs for severe repetitive 
loss properties and repetitive flood claims (FEMA, 2006).    
Hazard mitigation received unprecedented policy and programmatic attention in the 1990s, 
a fact attributed to the leadership of James Lee Witt, the FEMA director appointed by President 
Clinton (Cooper and Block, 2006, 61). Witt refocused FEMA from civil defense to an all-hazards 
approach that focused on hazard prevention and mitigation, including the establishment of a 
Mitigation Directorate. He initiated a number of unprecedented mitigation programs, including the 
acquisition and relocation of flood-prone buildings after the 1993 Midwest Floods and the creation 
of Project Impact in 1997. Although Witt led FEMA from a dysfunctional “turkey farm” to a 
respected and effective federal agency, many of the advances in mitigation policy were undone after 
the election of President G.W. Bush, and his nomination of a new, less experienced, FEMA director, 
Joe Allbaugh (Tierney, 2006). One of President Bush’s first disaster-related actions was to cancel 
Project Impact early in 2001, an early indication that the De Witt’s focus on mitigation would not 
survive the change of administration. More generally, the Bush administration’s change of direction 
reveals the extent to which emergency management in the United States is shaped by presidential 
priorities (Sylves, 2008).  
The emergency management system in the United States changed dramatically after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. When FEMA was integrated into the newly formed 
Department of Homeland Security, the overwhelming focus on homeland security led to the 
sidelining of natural disaster programs overall, and mitigation in particular (Tierney, 2006; 
Birkland, 2006). The 2006 Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) restored 
                                                             
7 10% under the Stafford Act of 1988, increased to 15% under the DMA 2000 
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some of FEMA’s autonomy and may have improved preparedness and response, but did little to 
address the issue of mitigation. While the DMA 2000 requirements and FEMA’s pre-disaster 
mitigation and HMGP continue to fund and promote hazard mitigation at the state and local level, 
mitigation is no longer the federal priority that it was a decade ago (Birkland, 2006). 
Canada 
Despite following a similar trajectory to the United States through the civil defense era of 
emergency management in the 1960s and 1970s, Canada did not adopt the same focus on hazard 
mitigation that the emerged in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, federal disaster policy 
remained largely reactive and response-oriented, while mitigation efforts were generally piecemeal 
and under-funded (Henstra et al., 2004; Henstra & McBean, 2005). In fact, the National Disaster 
Mitigation Strategy (NDMS) adopted in 2008 concedes that, “mitigation is a key element of 
emergency management which to date has received relatively little emphasis in spite of increasing 
disaster costs” (Public Safety Canada, 2008). Nevertheless, a few federal policies and programs have 
long had the potential to influence hazard mitigation. 
In 1970, the federal government created the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements 
(DFAA), which outlines the process for provinces and territories to receive federal disaster 
assistance. Provinces/territories may apply for federal cost-sharing of disaster costs when eligible 
expenditures exceed C$1 per capita (based on the provincial/territorial population). Until recently, 
DFAA funds could only be used to rebuild infrastructure to its pre-existing condition8. However, 
2008 revisions to the DFAA guidelines now allow “federal cost-sharing with provinces and 
territories for enhancements to damaged infrastructure for the purpose of mitigation” (Public 
Safety Canada, 2009). Unlike federal disaster assistance in the United States, DFAA funds cannot be 
distributed directly to individuals and businesses, only to the affected provincial/ territorial 
government, who then disburses the funds to local governments and citizens.  
Another federal program of note is the Flood Damage Reduction Program (FDRP), 
established in the federal department Environment Canada in 1975. The goal of the FDRP is to 
“curtail escalating disaster assistance payments in known flood risk areas,” and it functions by 
mapping flood risk and designating flood risk areas where the federal government will neither 
develop nor support development, for example by excluding new development in mapped risk 
areas from disaster assistance payments (Environment Canada, 2009). More than 900 communities 
have been mapped and these communities are encouraged to zone in accordance with the flood 
hazard maps (Environment Canada, 2009). Despite its accomplishments, the program has faced 
some criticism regarding its long term impact on vulnerability (Shrubsole, 2000). 
A number of federal programs participate in cost-sharing for hazard mitigation projects. 
The Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund and the Municipal Rural Infrastructure Fund are two 
funding programs that occasionally fund structural mitigation projects. The Joint Emergency 
Preparedness Program, established in 1980, also funds mitigation projects, particularly critical 
infrastructure protection projects, though the focus of the program, as its name suggests, is 
preparedness, rather than mitigation.  
                                                             
8 The U.S. HMGP retains the same restriction. Improvements on the pre-disaster condition must be funded 
separately, through the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program. 
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In 1988, the Emergencies Act and the Emergency Preparedness Act formalized emergency 
management in Canada and made Emergency Preparedness Canada a stand-alone federal 
department, reporting to its own cabinet minister. This enhanced the standing of emergency 
management overall, but the foci of the legislation, like its 2007 successor, the Emergency 
Management Act (EMA) and the accompanying policy document, the Emergency Management 
Framework (EMF), were preparedness and response. Although federal policy documents call for an 
all-hazards approach to emergency management and prescribe a comprehensive approach that 
includes attention to mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, the vast majority of federal 
attention and resources went to preparedness and response (Hwacha, 2005). Both sets of 
legislation are silent on mitigation. The only mention of mitigation is one reference in the EMA – 
stating that in their required emergency management plans, federal ministers must address how 
they will “mitigate the effect of foreign armed conflict on Canada” in the event of war (Emergency 
Management Act, 2007). 
The first consultation on the 
development of a national disaster mitigation 
policy was held in 1998, though it would not be 
adopted for another decade. Hwacha (2005) 
outlines the deliberative process that yielded 
the NDMS and identifies the challenges that 
delayed the policy’s adoption, including 
governance issues and disagreements about 
funding requirements and allocation. Despite 
these challenges, Canada adopted its first federal 
mitigation policy, the National Disaster 
Mitigation Strategy (NDMS), in 2008. The NDMS 
governance model seen in Figure 4 “sets out a 
comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach 
that anticipates joint contributions, community-
based partnerships, and national-level 
initiatives” (Public Safety Canada, 2008). The 
adoption of the NDMS seems to signal a long 
called for (Shrubsole, 2000; Henstra, 2005) 
policy shift in favor of mitigation. However, 
while the NDMS establishes an 
intergovernmental framework for mitigation 
activities, unlike the DMA 2000, it does not 
mandate any particular mitigation activities. In 
the two years since its adoption, there is scant 
evidence that any mitigation projects have been 
undertaken as a result of the NDMS. It may be 
some time before results of the strategy 
trickle down to the local level.  
In 2010, Public Safety Canada established the National Strategy and Action Plan for Critical 
Infrastructure, with the goal of building a “safer, more secure and more resilient Canada,” based on 
the principles and governance framework established in the EMF (Public Safety Canada, 2010). Like 
Figure 4. NDMS Governance Model. (Public Safety Canada, 2008) 
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the NDMS, while it is too soon to tell whether this plan will have an impact on hazard mitigation at 
the local level, its mission suggests potential for synergy with the NDMS and other disaster risk 
reduction initiatives. 
In the absence of federal legislation mandating hazard mitigation measures, several 
provinces have adopted their own legislation. Most notable are Quebec’s Civil Protection Act (2000) 
and Ontario’s Emergency Readiness Act (2002), both of which require the development of local 
hazard mitigation plans.  
2.2 HAZARD MITIGATION THEMES IN THE U.S. AND CANADA 
 The emergency management systems in the United States and Canada have a lot in common. 
Reviewing the literature on hazard mitigation in the two countries, a number of common themes 
emerge. These themes include decreasing reliance on structural mitigation; challenges of shared 
governance; federal policies that distort risk; and recognition of the importance of local capacity. 
The three latter themes deal with the challenges of managing hazard mitigation in a federal, 
intergovernmental system.  
The Safe Development Paradox: Structural vs. Non-Structural Mitigation 
The safe development paradox (Burby, 2006) refers to the fact that the multitude of federal 
programs and policies designed to reduce natural hazard risk have increased risk exposure and 
vulnerability. Natural hazard scholars have come to recognize that, in the long term, structural 
hazard mitigation projects, particularly in the absence of non-structural measures, can erode 
community resilience by providing a false sense of security and promoting development in hazard-
prone areas (Godschalk et al., 1999; Burby, 2006; Robinson & Cruikshank, 2006; Birkland, 2010). 
This expanded vulnerability is compounded by the fact that disasters are far more than a physical 
problem. Social, economic, demographic and cultural issues have a significant influence on how 
people are affected, including choices about mitigation and risk exposure (Cutter, 1996). Structural 
mitigation addresses only the physical aspects of hazard exposure, but not the root causes of 
vulnerability.  
Both the United States and Canada have policies that emphasize structural mitigation. For 
example, Robinson and Cruikshank (2006) conclude that after Hurricane Hazel in 1953, local 
governments favored non-structural mitigation solutions, such as floodplain management, but the 
Canadian federal government emphasized relief, reconstruction and structural solutions that 
promoted development in hazardous areas. The federal approach triumphed and was 
institutionalized with the 1953 Canada Water Conservation Assistance Act, which included federal 
cost sharing for structural engineering projects (Robinson & Cruikshank, 2006). The federal 
government has implemented similar legislation in the United States. An 1861 report by the Army 
Corps of Engineers recommended massive levee construction to control flooding in the Mississippi 
River Basin and this became the de facto national flood policy well into the 20th century (Cigler, 
1996). The same basic policy is embodied in contemporary legislation, including the 1982 Coastal 
Barrier Resources Act, which funded structural projects on barrier islands, rendering them ripe for 
development (Burby et al., 1999).  Despite their dubious record, the popularity of such structural 
measures is explained by Cooper and Block (2006, 24) as a politically useful form of redistributive 
spending. The levee system in New Orleans, and its failure during Hurricane Katrina, epitomizes the 
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safe development paradox and the vulnerability created by reliance on structural mitigation 
(Cooper and Block, 2006).  
The safe development paradox is being increasingly recognized by federal, state, and local 
governments (May & Williams, 1986; Godschalk et al., 1999). This shift was most evident during the 
Clinton administration in the U.S., particularly after the 1993 floods, when acquisition and 
relocation programs were used to reduce long-term exposure to flood hazards (Godschalk et al., 
1999). The increased focus on planning embodied in the DMA 2000 is another example of an 
institutional move toward non-structural mitigation.  
Shrubsole (2000) wrote that Canada was at a crossroads in flood management – choosing 
between continuing to build more and bigger flood-control structures that would continue to 
increase the loss potential, and institutional changes that would integrate structural and non-
structural mitigation in a holistic manner. A decade later, structural mitigation remains a priority, 
though it is accompanied by increasing attention to the socio-economic causes of vulnerability and 
community resilience (Henstra et al., 2004; Hwacha, 2005). A 2004 report by Infrastructure Canada 
emphasized the need to move toward a “comprehensive vulnerability management” paradigm that 
targets communities’ vulnerabilities (physical, social, environmental) in a holistic manner (Henstra 
et al., 2004). Despite this growing focus on sustainability and resilience, however, non-structural 
mitigation (particularly hazard mitigation planning) remains largely the domain of 
provincial/territorial and local governments, with little federal involvement. Where it exists at all, 
the federal mitigation discourse in Canada focuses on the protection and enhancement of critical 
infrastructure and large structural mitigation projects like the much-lauded Red River Floodway 
(Henstra et al., 2004; Government of Canada, 2004; Hwacha, 2005; Henstra & McBean, 2005). The 
potential of such projects to perpetuate the safe development paradox and increase future losses 
are recognized in the literature (see Shrubsole, 2000), but are not currently reflected in federal 
policy.  
The Challenges of Shared Governance 
 Since hazard mitigation in both the United States and Canada is part of a complex, 
intergovernmental emergency management system characterized by shared governance, successful 
mitigation requires intergovernmental coordination (May, 1991; Waugh, 1996; Newton, 1997; 
Berke, 1998; Godschalk et al., 1999; Henstra & McBean, 2005; LaFeber and Lind, 2008). May and 
Williams (1986, 21) define shared governance as “an intergovernmental partnership for which 
noteworthy decision-making power about program or regulatory design and/or operations is 
exercised by both those in the federal government and those in subnational governments.” If 
coordination between levels of government is lacking, opportunities to reduce risk may be missed 
or, as Henstra and McBean (2005) note, risk may be compounded, as it was during Hurricane 
Katrina, when communication breakdowns between local, state and federal agencies contributed to 
the failed disaster response.  
While intergovernmental coordination is essential for successful shared governance, it is 
very difficult to sustain (May & Williams, 1986; Henstra & McBean, 2005). This is because of a set of 
conditions variously called the “implementation dilemma,” (May & Williams, 1986; May, 1991) or 
“shared governance dilemma” (Berke, 1998, 80). The dilemma arises because the federal 
government, having a very high (~1) probability of disaster occurring within its jurisdiction in a 
given year and bearing much of the cost of disaster assistance, has the greatest incentive and 
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capacity for hazard mitigation but, constitutionally, disaster policy falls under the jurisdiction of 
state/provincial and local governments. Sub-national governments often lack capacity and/or 
political will to implement hazard mitigation programs, for a variety of reasons (May & Williams, 
1986; May, 1991; Burby et al., 1999; Newkirk, 2001; Henstra & McBean, 2005). The capacity of state 
emergency management organizations (EMOs) varies considerably. While the degree of hazard 
exposure explains the high capacity of states like hurricane-prone Florida and earthquake-prone 
California, other states have been slow to transition from civil defense to proactively addressing 
natural hazards (Waugh & Sylves, 1996). At the local level, most communities have a relatively low 
chance of experiencing a disaster in any given year (or election cycle). Local governments face 
competing demands for scarce resources, lack strong local demand for mitigation, and often have 
limited capacity to pursue mitigation projects on their own (May & Williams, 1986; May, 1991; 
Berke, 1998; Burby et al., 1999; Henstra & McBean, 2005; LaFeber & Lind, 2008). Local 
governments also face a local development paradox, given that non-structural mitigation costs 
municipalities doubly: both the cost of the mitigation measures themselves and the loss of tax 
revenues and other economic activity if they disallow development in (often high value) hazard 
locations, such as coastlines (Birkland & Waterman, 2008). At the individual level, many choose to 
ignore known risks, or take a fatalistic approach to natural hazards (May & Williams, 1986; May, 
1991; Waugh & Hy, 1996). At all levels, intergovernmental coordination can also be hampered by 
governmental fragmentation, which complicates coordination (LaFeber & Lind, 2008).  
 The barriers to intergovernmental coordination are many, but they can be overcome. 
Scanlon (1994) suggests that the use of pre-disaster planning, as well as the use of emergency 
operations systems (EOCs) in disaster response, can help overcome some of the barriers to 
coordination. Waugh and Sylves (1996, 123) suggest that formal intergovernmental partnerships 
and regional planning “hold great potential in helping the United States, Canada, and perhaps other 
countries with complex federal systems, better manage major disasters.” They present case studies 
of three successful intergovernmental tools for intergovernmental partnerships in California: 
Operational Area Management, the Operational Area Satellite Information System (OASIS), and the 
Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) (Waugh & Sylves, 1996).  
Federal Disaster Policy and Risk Distortion 
“Massive exposure to risk is […] the direct result of the failed policies of the federal 
government. Moreover, federal policy stands to a large extent as a major stumbling block in 
efforts to reduce it.” -Burby et al. (1999, 248) 
 The shared governance dilemma is exacerbated by the moral hazard problem inherent in 
the majority of federal disaster programs (Burby et al., 1999; Henstra & McBean, 2005; Smith & 
Wenger, 2006; Robinson & Cruikshank, 2006; Burby, 2006; Birkland, 2010). Moral hazard refers to 
“the existence of insurance against a risk that may cause people to be less diligent about mitigating 
risk, relying instead on insurance to compensate for any disaster” (Birkland et al., 2003, 47). As 
Burby et al. (1999, 250) muse, “why require property owners to invest in disaster-resistant design 
and construction […] when the federal government will blunt any losses that occur by offering 
income tax write-offs, generous disaster relief payouts, and insurance subsidies?” By transferring 
risk from individuals to society as a whole, federal disaster assistance and insurance subsidies 
distort risk and encourage individuals and sub-national governments to develop hazard-prone 
areas and/or to forgo hazard mitigation.   
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In the United States, the main target of moral hazard accusations is NFIP, whose premiums that 
are not actuarially sound and do not reflect the true risk (and cost) of building in hazardous 
locations (Godschalk et al., 1999; Sylves, 2008; Birkland, 2010). As well, generous Individual 
Assistance, or the expectation that it will be available, induces people to take risks that they might 
otherwise forgo (Birkland, 2010). In addition to these pre-existing programs, Birkland (2010) 
contends that the federal government has inadvertently stoked demand for disaster relief, 
particularly during the Clinton Administration, when disaster relief was seen as politically 
expedient. What Birkland (2010, 5) terms “federalism creep” has led to an ever-growing role of the 
federal government in disasters, and a concomitant diminishing of local incentives to mitigate 
hazards in their jurisdictions.   
In Canada, Shrubsole (2000) criticizes the Flood Damage Reduction Program and Disaster 
Federal Assistance Arrangements and likens their moral hazard effect to the NFIP in the United 
States, stating that since the program simply restores structures to their pre-disaster state9, they 
are likely to induce long-term losses to rise, rather than fall. The programs, he charges “encourage a 
culture of dependency by local governments on senior governments and an associated cycle of 
escalating flood losses” (Shrubsole, 2000, 18). With regard to the repeated flooding of the Red River 
in Manitoba, Simonovic 2004, 4) asserts that, “flood fighting, management of flood control systems, 
and responsibility for post-flood recovery all rest largely in the hands of the government, freeing 
the individual from a perception of responsibility until a crisis.” That said, the emerging focus on 
resilience, as well as DFAA amendments to include mitigation funding may begin to mitigate some 
of the moral hazard.  
Local Capacity: Lynchpin of Hazard Mitigation 
 Hazard mitigation scholars both sides of the border emphasize the key role played by local 
governments (Scanlon, 1996; Hightower & Coutu, 1996; Waugh, 1996, 346; Buckland & Rahman, 
1999; Newkirk, 2001; Pearce, 2003; LaFeber & Lind, 2008; Birkland & Waterman, 2008). LaFeber 
and Lind (2008, 554) emphasize that federal organizations are only as strong as their state and 
local counterparts. For while federal governments can create incentive programs and offer 
technical assistance, the constitutional division of power limits their ability to implement hazard 
mitigation projects, which fall under local jurisdiction. 
Local capacity and political commitment to hazard mitigation has been shown to affect disaster 
outcomes. For example, Scanlon (1996) finds that the support of local government officials was a 
key to successful disaster planning. He also determined that disaster response tended to be more 
effective when the mayor was involved – a finding that also suggests the importance of local 
government in planning and mitigation prior to disaster events (Scanlon, 1996).  In addition to the 
involvement of local officials, Pearce (2003) argues that disaster management must be integrated 
into community planning in order to shift from the current focus on preparedness and response to 
sustainable hazard mitigation. Public participation at the local level, not only by local governments, 
but by residents, will be critical to the success of such an initiative (Pearce, 2003).  “Shared public 
decision making,” she says, “is crucial to any effective approach to mitigation” (Pearce, 2003, 227).  
                                                             
9 The DFAA changed this policy in 2008. 
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Often, discussion of local capacity building occurs in the context of a critique of the federally-
dominated emergency management system (Buckland & Rahman, 1999; Birkland & Waterman, 
2008; Cooper & Block, 2006). Birkland and Waterman (2008, 710) warn that the dominance of the 
federal government could erode local capacity, as they contend occurred in New Orleans prior to 
Hurricane Katrina. Buckland and Rahman (1999, 189) discuss the local pushback in Manitoba 
communities against top-down evacuation orders during the Red River floods, and suggest that 
higher levels of government afford localities “equal partnerships, mutual respect, and open, two-
way communication,” rather than command and control style orders.  
Despite a long history of “command and control” disaster management, Canada’s National 
Disaster Mitigation Strategy acknowledges that, “a governance structure that engages and enhances 
local-level responsibility is more effective than a top-down approach, especially considering the 
many opportunities for partnering in local mitigation projects” (Public Safety Canada, 2008). It is 
possible that this may signal a policy shift toward a more bottom-up approach to hazard mitigation. 
However, as Waugh and Sylves (1996, 48) wrote of Witt’s mitigation-oriented reforms in the 1990s, 
“the real test of whether changes in the national system are meaningful will come in the disaster 
response and hazard management capabilities of thousands of local governments.”  
In the United States, meanwhile, the homeland security regime has led to increasing 
concentration of emergency management capacity at the federal level (Birkland & Waterman, 
2008). This concentration has the potential for dire effects on community capacity to mitigate and 
prepare for disaster (Tierney, 2006; Birkland & Waterman, 2008).   
2.3 POLICY DIVERGENCE 
 The preceding discussion reveals that while they deal with many of the same issues, there 
are several areas of policy divergence in the United States and Canada. In order to further elucidate 
some of the ways in which hazard policy differs between the United States and Canada, the 
following section briefly contrasts the two systems in terms of two related themes: the political 
salience of disaster and the degree and nature of federal involvement.  
Political Salience of Disaster: consequences for hazard mitigation  
 Disasters have greater political salience in the United States than in Canada (Newton, 1999). 
This has repercussions for the amount of policy attention and resources dedicated to mitigation. 
One possible reason for this is that overall disaster losses in Canada are lower, so federal action to 
minimize losses through mitigation has remained less of a priority (Newton, 1999). Another factor 
is that disaster assistance, which often funds mitigation measures, is not as highly politicized in 
Canada as the United States. The fact that the federal government does not disburse aid directly to 
citizens and that funding decisions are made by provincial/territorial governments may reduce the 
political pressure on Ottawa to ratchet up spending. Meanwhile, in the United States, Birkland and 
Waterman (2008) attribute excessive policy to James Lee Witt and the Clinton administration, who 
recognized and capitalized on disasters as political opportunities.  
 Despite the greater political salience of disaster in the United States, the role of mitigation in 
U.S. disaster policy has been waning since the end of the Clinton administration. “The DMA 
notwithstanding,” writes Birkland (2010, 10), attention to mitigation and the effort devoted to this 
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activity is much less important to FEMA and to federal leaders – and, therefore – to states – than it 
was before DMA 2000.” Policy attention to the mitigation of natural disasters in the United States 
has waned concomitantly with the rise of homeland security (Tierney, 2006). Meanwhile, 
throughout the past decade, Canada has been working with the provinces and territories to develop 
and adopt its first mitigation policy, the NDMS, and a host of other relevant policies and programs, 
described in section three, to reduce their hazard exposure.  
The Federal Role in Emergency Management 
 Due in part to its political salience, federal involvement in disasters and disaster mitigation 
remains (for the moment) much more substantial in the United States than in Canada. The federal 
role differs based on variation in the federal structures and intergovernmental relations (Waugh, 
1996; Newton, 1997). To begin with, Newton (1997, 236) notes that, “the American system of 
government concentrates power, leading to a greater direct involvement in the formation of 
legislation and the disbursement of funds, than that seen in Canada.” The Canadian system, in 
contrast, places more emphasis on consultation and the formation of partnerships, as exemplified 
by the “deliberative dialogue approach” used in the development of the NDMS (Newton, 1999; 
Hwacha, 2005). Second, in Canada, clearly established provincial responsibility prevents federal 
agencies from “presuming authority” as they are wont to do in the United States, particularly during 
major (or potentially major) disasters (for example, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma) (Waugh, 
1996; Cooper & Block, 2006). Finally, Newton (1999, 233) notes that Canada’s legislation 
incorporates much more flexibility and room for interpretation– outlining the framework for 
intergovernmental coordination rather than specific mandates – while U.S. mitigation legislation, 
such as DMA 2000, is much more definitive. Although comparative analyses (Waugh & Sylves, 1996; 
Newton, 1999) identified these trends in the 1990s, several of the differences (such as the relative 
concentration of disaster authority in the U.S.) have been exacerbated by the reorganization of both 
emergency management systems in the wake of 9/11/2001, highlighting the need for renewed 
comparative policy analysis. 
2.4 REFLECTIONS ON THE FEDERAL ROLE IN MITIGATION 
As disaster losses increase, hazard mitigation is becoming an increasingly important part of 
the disaster cycle. In both Canada and the United States, recognition of the safe development 
paradox, the shared-governance dilemma and the role of federal policy in perpetuating and 
increasing risk are hastening a shift in hazard mitigation policy from hazard resistance to resilient 
communities (Henstra & McBean, 2005). With the concept of resilience comes increasing attention 
to strengthening local capacity. 
 While the political salience and degree of federal involvement in mitigation are still greater 
in the United States than in Canada, policy trends suggest that this may be changing. Since the turn 
of the century, policy attention to mitigation has been declining in the United States while it has 
been growing in Canada. However, the frequent reorganization of federal emergency management 
agencies in both countries points to its highly political nature. Given this volatility, it is not yet clear 
whether the current trend will last long enough to bring about enduring institutional change. 
 As this section has illustrated, there are many challenges to effective hazard mitigation 
policy. Among the greatest challenges facing all levels of government in both the United States and 
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Canada is intergovernmental coordination. Developing mechanisms to overcome the shared 
governance dilemma will be essential before governments are able to effectively tackle the issues of 
moral hazard and the safe development paradox. Another challenge will be mobilizing public 
participation in hazard mitigation policy-making. While hazard mitigation has traditionally been a 
“policy without a public” (May, 1991; Birkland, 2006), planning literature has long emphasized the 
importance of public buy-in for the implementation of policy measures, and highlighted the 
potential of participatory hazard mitigation planning as a powerful tool to advance hazard 
mitigation and community resilience (Pearce, 2003; Berke, 1998). 
 Despite these challenges, the current policy environment also presents a number of 
opportunities for hazard mitigation policy. In Canada, the adoption of the NDMS and an emerging 
dialogue about vulnerability and resilience hint at a favorable environment for hazard mitigation 
policy. The language of the NDMS also recognizes the role of local governments and the need for a 
bottom-up approach that builds local capacity (Public Safety Canada, 2008). In the United States, 
despite its shortcomings, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the emergence 
of a homeland security industry have focused a lot of policy attention and resources on emergency 
management. If but a fraction of these resources could be harnessed for natural hazard mitigation, 
it might succeed in regaining its former status as an emergency management priority.    
 Given the constraints of a federal system, hazard mitigation outcomes depend to a 
considerable extent on how federal policies are interpreted and implemented at lower levels of 
government. Analysis of mitigation policy at the state/provincial and local levels, with due 
consideration of the federal policy context, will provide additional insight into best practices in 
mitigation policy, including ways of managing hazard risk in a complex, federal system.  
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3 .  P R O V I N C I A L  &  S T A T E   I N S T I T U T I O N S  
 How federal hazard mitigation policies are translated at the state and provincial level 
and how these mid-level governments relate to local governments has a considerable impact 
on outcomes at the local level. For example, Berke and French (1992) and Berke (1998) find 
that the presence and content of state planning mandates have a significant effect on the 
quality of hazard mitigation plans and ordinances implemented by local governments.  In 
order to explore intergovernmental governance arrangements in the United States and 
Canada, this section begins with a discussion of the context of federalism and the four types of 
governance arrangements that states and provinces can engage in within the federal system 
(Berke, 1998). The hazard environment, legislation, and programs related to hazard mitigation 
in the province of British Columbia and the state of Washington are then discussed and 
categorized. Finally, the implications of these governance arrangements for the local 
implementation of hazard mitigation measures are discussed and a hypothesis about local 
outcomes is developed.             
3.1 SHARED GOVERNANCE AND HAZARD MITIGATION  
Federalism and Hazard Mitigation 
Federalism, the governing principle characterized by the distribution of specified legislative 
powers between a central authority and its constituent units (Merriam-Webster), is a defining 
feature of government in both Canada and the United States.  Although both federal governments 
have a powerful interest in hazard mitigation, federal power sharing agreements and constitutional 
limitations circumscribe the influence of federal laws and programs on local mitigation decisions. 
While the federal governments lack the authority to regulate local land use, state and provincial 
governments have much greater latitude to influence the regulation of natural hazards and land use 
management. Although some provinces, including British Columbia, are moving toward delegating 
increasing governing authority to local governments, all Canadian municipalities are still defined as 
“creatures of the province” under the Constitution Act of 1867. In the United States, local 
governments are also “creatures of the state”, but the authority of states over local governments 
depends on their status as either “Dillon’s Rule” or “Home Rule” states. In “Dillon’s Rule” states, 
local governments have only those powers expressly granted to them by state laws, while local 
governments in “Home Rule” states have greater autonomy. In some states, such as Washington, 
some parts of the state operate under home rule charters, while the rest operates under state 
authority. Since the state constitutional amendment allowing county home rule charters was 
passed in Washington in 1969, six counties have adopted them: Clallam, King, Pierce, Snohomish, 
Whatcom, and San Juan.  
As a result of the federal power sharing arrangements in Canada and the United States, federal 
governments shape the policy environment and provide incentives, but have little regulatory power 
over local governments.  Local governments are central to the implementation of hazard mitigation 
measures and have the final say when it comes to local land use decision making, but often lack the 
resources or political will to pursue hazard mitigation measures on their own. However, states and 
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provinces, with their combination of financial resources and regulatory powers, have considerable, 
and perhaps underestimated, influence over the hazard mitigation practices of local governments.  
According to Berke (1998, 81), “states have begun to intervene as key actors in natural hazard 
mitigation, occupying a strategic position between federal and local governments.”  As we shall see, 
state and provincial governments act both as intermediaries - adopting and administering federal 
programs - and as regulators and mobilizing agents in their own right.  
Shared Governance Arrangements  
Federal, state/provincial, and 
local governments can share power in a 
variety of ways. Shared governance 
arrangements can be characterized in 
several ways (May & Williams, 1986; 
Berke, 1998; May et al., 1996). Berke 
(1998) builds on the policy 
characterization by May and Williams 
(1986) when he divides possible 
governance arrangements into four 
categories depending on whether they 
are regulatory or incentive-based, and 
whether federal and local governments 
share funding and authority over 
initiatives equally (full partnership), or in a limited way, with the higher level of government 
dominating (limited partnership) (see Figure 5). According to this characterization, Berke (1998) 
describes a Type 1 governance arrangement as a “full regulatory partnership”, in which both (or all) 
levels of government have significant roles and authority. In a Type 2 arrangement, a “collaborative 
partnership,” different levels of government collaboratively develop and implement non-regulatory 
hazard mitigation measures. Type 3 is called a “regulatory limited partnership” and involves higher 
levels of government directly regulating those subject to their authority. One of the most common 
examples of Type 3 regulation is federal environmental legislation in the United States. Finally, 
Berke (1998) calls Type 4 the “mobilization approach,” in which higher levels rely on incentives 
(information, funds, etc.) to mobilize lower levels of government to take action.  
In a related policy typology, May et al. (1996) characterizes governance arrangements as 
either coercive or cooperative. Coercive policies are top-down, relying on higher levels of 
government for policy innovations, which are then prescribed and enforced at the local level. This 
corresponds to Berke’s (1998) limited partnerships, in which local governments are conduits for 
state/provincial or federal policy, but not active participants in policy formation. Cooperative 
policies, which tend to be full partnerships, mandate processes and goals, but rely on local 
governments for policy innovation and commitment. If we divide provincial and state hazard 
mitigation institutions discussed above into Berke’s (1998) four categories, we will find that both 
countries take a hybrid approach to hazard mitigation policy, combining all four types of 
governance arrangements.  
  
Figure 5. Types of Shared Governance Arrangements 
 (Berke, 1998) 
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 3.2 HAZARD MITIGATION IN THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
Hazardscape  
British Columbia, the Western-most province 
of Canada, borders the Pacific Ocean (see Figure 6). 
Most of the province’s population of roughly 4,510,858 
(Stats Canada, 2010 estimate) reside in the south west 
corner of the province. The province is located in one 
of the world’s most geologically active areas, 
commonly known as the “Pacific Ring of Fire” (B.C. 
Ministry of Transportation, 1996). Low frequency, 
high-impact hazards resulting from this geological 
activity include volcanoes, earthquakes, and tsunamis. 
Canada’s largest earthquake was a magnitude 8.1 quake 
that occurred west of B.C.’s Queen Charlotte Islands in 
August of 1949. The most recent widely felt earthquake 
was a magnitude 7.4 quake that occurred south of the 
Queen Charlotte Islands in June of 1970. Small tsunamis 
affected B.C.’s outer coast after offshore earthquakes in 
1960 (1.2m waves in Tofino) and 1964 (6m waves in Port 
Alberni). The province also has about 100 volcanoes that 
have been active in the past two million years. The most 
recent explosive eruption occurred approximately 2,300 
years ago from Mt. Meager, about 150 km north of 
Vancouver, while the most recent lava eruption in the 
province occurred from the Tseaux River Cone (Canada’s 
youngest volcano) approximately 200 years ago.  
Much more common hazards are the relatively 
lower impact, higher frequency incidences of flooding, 
subsidence, and slope-failures – including landslides, 
avalanches, and debris flows. The hazards that occur 
frequently in British Columbia, as characterized by the 
Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure, are 
summarized in Table 1. In addition to those listed, wildfires 
pose a significant risk in some areas, most notably in the 
province’s interior, and a variety of weather-related 
hazards, from winter storms to heat waves, can adversely 
affect the population.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. British Columbia (Source: ESRI) 
Table 1. High Frequency 
Hazards in British Columbia 
Landsides - Rock falls/topples 
-Earth falls 
- Rock slumps 
- Earth slumps 
- Rock slides 
- Rock flows 
- Debris flows 
- Earth flows 
- Rock creep 
- Earth creep/ solifluction  
Avalanches - Snow avalanches 
Subsidence - Subsidence due to 
underground activity by 
people 
- Subsidence due to 
natural removal of 
underground material 
Flooding - Stream/river flooding 
- Lake/reservoir flooding 
- Alluvial fan flooding 
- Flooding due to storm 
surges and tsunamis 
Erosion - Channel erosion (bed 
and bank) 
- Lake/reservoir shoreline 
erosion 
- Coastal shoreline 
erosion 
Problem 
Soils 
- Glacial lake silts 
- Glacial marine and 
marine clays 
- Organic soils 
- Soils in discontinuous 
permafrost and alpine 
permafrost 
- made ground (fill) 
 
Source: B.C. Ministry of Transportation, 1996 
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Legislation 
Legislation is, by definition, a regulatory arrangement, but can be structured to generate 
either a Type 1 (full partnership) or Type 2 (limited partnership) relationship between the 
provincial and local governments. In British Columbia, the pieces of legislation that follow set the 
stage for Type 1 governance arrangements. The Local Government Act (RSBC 1996, c. 323) provides 
the legal framework for the establishment and continuation of local governments. It defines the 
powers of municipalities and regional districts, including authority relating to planning and land 
management (Part 26). Section 875 of the Act authorizes communities to create and adopt an 
Official Community Plan (OCP). If local governments choose to prepare and adopt an OCP, the 
province requires that the plan include a written statement including restrictions on the use of land 
subject to hazardous conditions. OCPs can also include Development Permit Areas, a tool that can 
be used to protect development from natural hazards. Many communities choose to use OCPs as a 
development management tool. The Local Government Act also includes the B.C. Building Code, 
which is based on the model National Building Code of Canada 2005. The Code establishes 
minimum construction standards, however the code or some variation must be adopted and 
enforced by local governments as they see fit.  
The Land Title Act (RBSC 1996, c. 250, division 2) and the Local Services Act Subdivision 
Regulations (B.C. Reg. 262/70) govern land ownership and title transactions, including the 
subdivision of land, in unincorporated areas. The subdivision process includes the identification of 
natural hazards. Until 2003, pursuant to section 86, approval of any subdivision could have been 
denied by the provincial Approving Officer if the land in question may be subject to a natural 
hazard. The Flood Hazard Statutes Amendment Act of 2003 devolved responsibility for subdivision 
approvals in incorporated areas, as well as approval of floodplain bylaws and variances, to local 
governments.  
Another provincial emergency management regulation that relates to mitigation is British 
Columbia’s 1995 Local Authority Emergency Management Regulation, which requires all local 
authorities to prepare emergency plans. It mandates that local plans include the identification of 
potential emergencies and disasters and a risk assessment evaluating potential damage to people 
and property. They must also identify procedures for warning the population in their jurisdiction of 
imminent hazards or disaster. Hazard warning systems, as well as hazard and vulnerability 
assessments, can be considered hazard mitigation, though they overlap somewhat with the concept 
of preparedness.  
A second group of hazard-related legislation generates Type 2 governance arrangements, in 
which the provincial government directly regulates activities in local jurisdictions. Their most 
common application in British Columbia is for floodplain management, which is the most 
thoroughly institutionalized form of hazard mitigation in the province (Slaymaker, 1999). In 
addition to the Local Government Act, the B.C. Dike Maintenance Act and the Ditch, Drainage and 
Dike Act authorize the province to undertake flood management activities in the province. These 
Type 2 regulations give the province the authority to regulate and inspect both provincial and local 
flood control systems.  There are over 20 flood protection systems that fall under provincial 
jurisdiction, though the majority of public diking systems are managed by a variety of local 
authorities.  
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Finally, one piece of provincial legislation that regulates 
emergency preparedness but has a top-down, incentive-based 
(Type 4) relationship to mitigation is the Emergency Program Act 
(R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 111). This is the authorizing legislation for 
emergency management in British Colombia, and is administered 
by the provincial Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General. As 
with federal legislation, the focus of the regulations is on 
emergency response, as opposed to mitigation. As authorized in 
the Emergency Program Act, “a minister […] is responsible for 
coordinating the government's response to the occurrence of any 
of the hazards for which the minister is designated as the key 
minister in that schedule” [italics added]. The act does not 
explicitly mention mitigation. Limited deterrence to hazard-prone 
development is included, however, in the Act’s Compensation and 
Disaster Financial Assistance Regulation, which, like the federal 
FDRP, denies disaster assistance for public structures located in a 
designated floodplain. However, this eligibility criterion is not 
extended to privately owned structures in the floodplain, greatly 
diminishing its mitigative impact.  
Programs 
While the majority of provincial legislation takes a 
regulatory approach to hazard mitigation, programs tend to take a 
more voluntary, incentive-based approach and to facilitate Type 2 
and Type 4 governance arrangements. The province’s floodplain 
management programs tend to take a negotiated, inter-
governmental, Type 2 approach, while disaster assistance and 
other funding programs adopt a top-down mobilization approach. 
Type 2 floodplain management programs of note include the inter-
governmental Fraser River Flood Control Program (1968-1994) 
and the Floodplain Development Control Program (1975-2003), 
which allocated hundreds of millions of dollars to dike 
construction and upgrading and other structural flood protection 
measures.  
Type 4 programs include the Floodplain Mapping Program 
(1987-1994) – which was a joint effort by the provincial and 
federal governments to identify flood-prone areas and restrict 
development in those areas by making such development 
ineligible for public support – and the provincial administration of 
federal funding programs such as the Canada/BC Municipal Rural 
Infrastructure Fund and the management of relief funding through 
the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements.   
 Finally, provincial hazard mitigation also includes 
programs funded and executed exclusively by provincial agencies, 
such as the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure’s 
Hazard-Related Roles of B.C. 
Provincial Ministries 
 
Ministry of Agriculture  
Crop insurance 
Food Safety 
Drought management 
Flood management 
Plant disease management 
 
Ministry of Environment 
Air, land and water quality 
standards 
Integrated flood management 
Environmental emergency 
response 
Environmental monitoring (incl. 
flood forecasting) 
Climate action secretariat 
 
Ministry of Forests, Mines & 
Lands 
Wildfire protection 
Integrated Land Mgmt Bureau 
 
Ministry of Natural Resource 
Operations 
Drought management 
Floodplain management 
Dam and dyke safety & regulation 
Wildfire management 
Earthquake monitoring and info 
 
Ministry of Public Safety 
Provincial emergency management 
 
Ministry of Transportation and 
Infrastructure 
Rural subdivision permits, 
approvals & regulation (natural 
hazard identification requirement) 
 
Ministry of Energy 
Terrain Hazard Program 
(landslide risk assessment & 
mitigation) 
 
Ministry of Community, Sport & 
Culture 
Support for local land use planning 
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Figure 7. Governance Arrangements in B.C. 
Avalanche and Weather Programs, which protect motorists on provincial highways by monitoring 
and mitigating slope-failure threats. Mitigation techniques used include structural measures, such 
as snow sheds, arresting walls, diversion dikes, and catchment basins, as well as other measures 
such as closing roads and remotely triggering avalanches.   
Overview of Governance Arrangements 
As at the federal level, hazard mitigation in the province of British Columbia involve a 
complex set of horizontal (among provincial agencies) and vertical (with federal and local agencies) 
relationships. The relationship between the provincial and local governments in British Columbia, 
however, is not always clear and there is no unified program for natural hazard management in the 
province (Slaymaker, 1999). Slaymaker (1999) describes the “hazard problem” in British Columbia 
as an inter-institutional challenge requiring greater intergovernmental coordination and 
cooperation. He suggests that a “lack of progress has resulted from […] the independence of various 
levels of government that have the legal responsibility for hazard management (Slaymaker, 1999, 
323).  Many provincial ministries have responsibilities for some aspects of hazard mitigation, but 
gaps and redundancies are evident (see sidebar on page 3). For example, while programs for flood 
mitigation are quite well developed, other hazards, such as landslides and avalanches receive much 
less provincial attention. This lack of institutional coordination has created several challenges for 
local governments dealing with natural hazards: inconsistent requirements between jurisdictions; 
ill-defined hazard-related legislation; insufficient management tools; out-of-date floodplain maps; 
and the vulnerability of small communities with limited resources (Mannerstrom & Peters, 2010). 
In general, however, the provincial government (with federal support) assumes responsibility for 
hazard identification, monitoring and forecasting, since this is beyond the capacity of most local 
governments. Local governments, in turn, are responsible for the management of development 
affected by natural hazards (Slaymaker, 1999).  
Figure 7 shows that 
while all four types of 
shared governance 
arrangements exist, the 
majority of hazard 
mitigation institutions in 
British Columbia are either 
Type 1 (full partnership) or 
Type 4 (mobilization). 
Studies have shown that 
Type 1 arrangements, 
particularly mandated local 
planning, have resulted in 
stronger hazard-related 
elements in local plans and 
stronger development 
regulations to reduce 
exposure and mitigate the 
impacts of natural hazards 
(Burby and May, 1997). 
 
 Regulatory Incentive 
F
u
ll
-P
a
rt
n
e
r 
Type 1 
- Local Government Act 
 B.C. Building Code 
 OCP local planning authorization 
and required elements 
- Municipal subdivision regulation 
(required by Flood Hazard Statutes 
Amendment Act of 2003) 
- Local Authority Emergency Mgmt 
Reg.: mandates emergency planning 
Type 2 
- Flood management programs  
 Fraser River Flood Control 
Program 
 Floodplain Dev’t Control 
Program 
L
im
it
e
d
-P
a
rt
n
e
r 
Type 3 
- Dike Maintenance Act 
Type 4 
- Provincial administration of federal 
funding programs (+ matching funds) 
 Canada/BC Municipal Rural Infra. 
Fund 
 Floodplain Mapping Program 
-Compensation and Disaster Financial 
Assistance Regulation: denies 
compensation for public structures in 
floodplain 
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“Planning mandates,” writes Berke (1998, 82), “allow states to inject state-wide interests into local 
growth management decisions while recognizing the legitimacy of local concerns.” However, 
whether the mandated plans are actually implemented by local governments depends both on local 
capacity and commitment, and on the strength of the planning mandate (Berke, 1998). Type 4 
governance arrangements, like British Columbia’s Municipal Rural Infrastructure Fund, have the 
advantage of providing a variety of incentives that motivated communities can take advantage of to 
advance their hazard mitigation goals. However, the mobilization approach can have the 
disadvantage of increasing the vulnerability gap between proactive and laggard communities 
(Berke, 1998). The communities that lack the capacity and commitment to take advantage of 
incentive programs fall farther behind, while high capacity communities receive the lion’s share of 
state or provincial program benefits.  By combining Type 1 and Type 4 shared governance 
arrangements, British Columbia may be able to balance the benefits of mobilization with the equity-
enhancing effects of  planning mandates, which have the potential to improve the hazard mitigation 
commitment and capacity of all communities, and not only those already committed to the cause.  
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3.3 HAZARD MITIGATION IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
Hazardscape  
Like its neighbor to the north, the State of 
Washington (see Figure 8) has a diverse hazard 
environment.  The state has a population of 
6,664,195 (U.S. Census 2009 estimate). Washington’s 
2010 State Hazard Mitigation Plan identifies nine 
principal natural hazards (avalanche, drought, 
earthquake, flood, landslide, storms, tsunami, 
volcano, and wildland fire) and 11 technological 
hazards (abandoned underground mines, chemical, 
civil disturbance, dam failure, hazardous material, 
pipeline, radiological, terrorism, transportation, 
urban fire, and hazards of local scope). As a result of a risk assessment process, the State Hazard 
Mitigation Advisory Team determined that, of these hazards, the four hazards that pose the greatest 
threat in Washington State are: earthquake, flood, severe storm, and wildfire (SHMP, 2010). These 
natural hazards are largely geographically driven. The state’s location in the geologically active 
“Ring of Fire” yields seismic and volcanic threats: more than 1,000 earthquakes (the majority 
imperceptible to humans) occur in Washington each year, and the state has five major volcanoes: 
Mount Baker, Glacier Peak, Mount Rainier, Mount St. Helens and Mount Adams. Large earthquakes 
occurred in the state in 1946, 1949, 1965, and, most recently, the Nisqually Earthquake of 2001. 
The state’s mountainous landscape is accompanied by risk of landslides and avalanches – the 
deadliest of the state’s natural hazards. However, as in British Columbia, the most damaging hazard 
by far, in terms of property and economic damage, is flooding (SHMP, 2010).  
 Legislation 
Two broad categories encompass the majority of hazard mitigation legislation in 
Washington State: planning/growth management, and environmental regulation. The first, which 
includes multiple local planning requirements such as critical areas and floodplain management 
planning, create Type 1 partnerships. Hazard-related environmental legislation addresses a variety 
of more specific environmental threats and tends to yield Type 3 relationships.  
The first category of hazard legislation, growth management and planning, falls under the 
purview of Washington’s Growth Management Act (RCW 36.70A.060), which is administered by the 
Department of Commerce. The GMA was passed in 1990 in response to concerns about rapid 
growth and sprawl. It establishes goals and planning requirements for high growth counties and 
cities and requires all jurisdictions planning under it to employ a public participation process to 
develop and regularly update a comprehensive plan. These plans include six mandatory elements 
(land use, housing, capital facilities, utilities, transportation and, for counties, rural areas) and can 
include an optional “Hazard Reduction Element,” which is encouraged but not required. Twenty 
nine cities and counties, encompassing 95% of the state’s population, are now planning under the 
GMA, either by law or voluntarily. The GMA includes the Critical Areas Ordinance (CAO), which 
requires that all jurisdictions, even those not mandated to prepare comprehensive plans under the 
GMA, regulate critical areas, including frequently flooded areas and geologically hazardous areas. 
Figure 8. Washington State (Source: ESRI) 
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The CAO also prohibits the expansion of any jurisdiction’s 
designated urban growth areas into one-hundred year floodplains. 
In conjunction with the flood control elements of the Critical Areas 
Ordinance, the state Department of Ecology requires all 
jurisdictions to create a Floodplain Management Plan.  
The second group of hazard-related regulation includes the 
following environmental and safety legislation. The State Building 
Code Act (RCW 19.27, WAC 51) was adopted in 1974. The 
International Building Code 2003 has now been approved for use 
and includes requirements for seismic forces in new buildings and 
retrofits of existing buildings when >30% of roof or floor area is 
involved in an alteration. The Floodplain Management Act (RCW 
86.16, WAC 173-158) “requires development to avoid the 
floodway and minimize harm to floodplains and wetlands” 
(Washington SHMP, 2010, 6-18). The Shoreline Management Act 
(RCW 90.59, WAC 173-18 and -20) of 1971 restricts development 
of shoreline areas to “reasonable and appropriate uses” 
(Washington SHMP, 2010, 6-18). The Coastal Zone Management 
Act (PL 104-150) makes funds available to local governments for 
planning, environmental inventories, mapping, and policy 
development related to shorelines. Finally, the Forest Practices Act 
(RCW 76.09, WAC 222) requires owners of forest lands to manage 
their land use (i.e. logging) so as to minimize human-caused 
landslides. These five pieces of legislation directly regulate local 
land use with little local involvement, constituting a Type 3 
governance arrangement. 
Programs 
 Washington State’s hazard mitigation programs consist 
primarily of funding programs and public education programs. 
Funding programs can be divided into two types, the first being 
the state administration of federal programs, which sometimes 
includes the provision of matching funds. The Community 
Development Block Grant Program, administered by the 
Department of Commerce, is a prime example. It provides funds to 
improve or repair infrastructure, including mitigation projects that 
“deal with an imminent threat to public health and safety” 
(Washington SHMP, 2010, 6-17). The Emergency Management 
Division (EMD) of the state Military Department also administers a 
variety of federal funding programs. FEMA hazard mitigation 
programs administered (and in many cases partly funded) by the 
EMD include: the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Public 
Assistance, the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program, the Flood 
Mitigation Assistance Program, the Repetitive Flood Claims 
Program, and the Severe Repetitive Loss Program. The second 
Hazard-Related Roles of 
Washington State Agencies 
Department of Commerce 
Growth Management Services: 
Oversee GMA & CAO 
State Building Code Council: 
State Building Code 
Earthquake Construction Stds 
Local Government Division: 
Community Dev’t Block Grant 
Public Works Board:  
Public Works Trust Fund (loans for 
mitigation projects) 
 
Department of Ecology 
Flood Control Assistance Acct Prog. 
Water Resources Program 
Emergency Agric. Water Supply 
Funds 
 
Department of Nat. Resources 
Division of Geology and Earth 
Resources (hazard mapping and 
assessment) 
Firewise Program 
Forest Stewardship Program 
 
University of Washington 
Pacific Northwest Seismic 
Network 
Governor’s Office 
Public facilities siting decisions 
 
Military Department 
Emergency Management Division 
Administer and provide matching 
funds for FEMA funding programs 
 
Department of Transportation 
Bridge Seismic Retrofit Program 
Emergency Relief Program 
Federal Highways Bridge Program 
 
Transpo. Improvement Board 
Grant programs for local 
transportation mitigation projects 
 
County Road Admin. Board 
Rural Arterial Program (post-
disaster reconstruction) 
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type of funding program is that which is created and funded by the State. The Flood Control 
Assistance Account Program, which provides state funds to local governments to create flood 
control management plans and undertake flood control maintenance projects, is an example of this 
type of program. 
The second category of state program includes those dealing with research and public 
education. In addition to its role as an intermediary for FEMA funding programs, the EMD 
participates in a number of federal education and research programs, including the National 
Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, which provides information and advising to local 
governments implementing tsunami mitigation measures. Other programs such as the Firewise 
Program, a public education program about wildfire risk, and the Forest Stewardship Program, 
which assists private landowners with wildfire reduction practices, are administered by the 
Washington State Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The DNR offers technical assistance to 
local authorities for delineating and assessing hazard areas (Washington State CTED, 2003).  All of 
these funding and public education programs are incentive-based mobilization efforts by higher 
levels of government, constituting Type 4 relationships with local governments.  
Finally, the Earthquake Program, which coordinates and oversees seismic safety programs 
in the state, and the Volcano Program, which brings together five volcano working groups (one for 
each major volcano in the state), are cooperative intergovernmental arrangements that typify Type 
2 relationships. 
Overview of Governance Arrangements 
 Hazard mitigation in Washington State is coordinated by the Washington Military 
Department’s Emergency 
Management Division, which 
is responsible for preparing 
and updating the State 
Hazard Mitigation Plan 
(SHMP). The SHMP fulfills 
the state planning 
requirement under the DMA 
2000, keeping the state and 
its compliant local 
jurisdictions eligible for 
federal disaster assistance. 
The SHMP includes 
descriptions of all of the 
state-level hazard mitigation-
related projects and 
programs and, as part of the 
criteria for “enhanced” state 
plan status, includes a 
section outlining how hazard 
mitigation efforts are 
integrated with other state 
and regional planning 
 Regulatory Incentive 
Fu
ll 
 
Type 1 
- EMD State Hazard Mitigation Plan 
 fulfills DMA2000 
 assesses/compiles local HM plans  
 provides technical asst. to local 
gov’ts 
- State Building Code Act 
- Growth Management Act 
 Critical Areas Ordinance (local hazard 
ID and reg.) 
 Local Floodplain Mgmt Planning  
Type 2 
- Earthquake Program (coordinates and 
oversees local public education programs) 
- Volcano Program (coordinates 
workgroups for each of the state’s 
volcanoes) 
Li
m
it
ed
 
Type 3 
- Floodplain Mgmt Act 
- Shoreline Mgmt Act 
- Forest Practices Act 
Type 4 
-State administration of federal funding 
programs (+ some matching funds) 
 WSDOT, EMD, Dept of Commerce… 
- State funding programs: 
 Flood Control Assistance Account 
Program 
 Coastal Zone Mgmt Act 
 Public Works Trust Fund 
-Public Education & Research 
 Firewise Program  
 Hazard mapping and assessment: Dept. of 
Geology 
 Forest Stewardship Program  
 
Figure 9. Governance Arrangements in Washington 
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efforts. As a result, despite being just as fragmented between state agencies as it is in British 
Columbia (see sidebar on page 8), hazard mitigation institutions in Washington are likely to be 
better coordinated and integrated than their Canadian counterparts.  
As in British Columbia, the state provides technical assistance to local jurisdictions, 
including hazard identification and analysis that is beyond the capacity of many local governments. 
Unfortunately, as a result, many local jurisdictions choose to simply cut and paste the hazard 
assessment of their region from the state plan rather than supplementing it with locally-specific 
analysis for their local hazard mitigation plan. This is a trend that the state has identified as a 
shortcoming of this arrangement (SHMP, 2010).  Despite this weakness, the latest state hazard 
mitigation plan notes that, “during the 2007-2010 timeframe, it has become apparent that the local 
jurisdictions, when developing their plans, have realized the benefit of hazard mitigation planning 
beyond the plan merely being an avenue to grant funds, but for its actual intended purpose: to 
make a jurisdiction more resilient to hazards. Strategies have become more specific rather than 
overly broad; more project-oriented rather than process oriented” (SHMP, 2010, 3-22).  
  Another major aspect of the state’s technical assistance, as alluded to above, involves helping 
local jurisdictions remain eligible for and apply for funds through FEMA’s disaster assistance and 
hazard mitigation programs. While the state is responsible for mitigating the impact of hazards on 
state property (for example through public facility siting policies or seismic retrofits of state-owned 
infrastructure), local governments are ultimately responsible for the implementation of the 
majority of mitigation projects, which fall under local jurisdiction. 
As in British Columbia, Figure 9 shows that the majority of state hazard mitigation institutions 
in Washington State are Type 1 and Type 4 arrangements. The same advantages, disadvantages and 
synergies apply – namely that Type 4 mobilization is primarily beneficial to communities that 
already have high capacity and commitment, while Type 1 regulatory programs confer the capacity-
building benefits of local planning efforts on all communities. However, it is also evident that 
Washington has a greater number of Type 2 programs than British Columbia. This type of 
collaborative partnership has the advantage of promoting local commitment and ownership of 
mitigation projects because of its bottom-up, non-coercive nature (Berke, 1998).  
 
3.4 IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
The types of shared governance arrangements that have been institutionalized in British 
Columbia and Washington have implications for the implementation of hazard mitigation measures 
at the local level. While the effects on individual communities may vary according to community 
capacity, commitment, and other aspects of local context, we can make two broad assumptions. 
First, in general, full partnerships (Types 1 & 2) are more bottom-up and thus likely to produce 
more local policy innovation than limited partnerships (Types 3 & 4), which rely on policy direction 
from federal or state/provincial governments (May and Williams, 1986). Second, regulatory 
arrangements (Types 1 & 3) apply equally to all local jurisdictions and are thus likely to be more 
even in their outcomes (i.e. provide all residents with a baseline of protection from natural hazards) 
than voluntary program arrangements (Types 2 & 4), which will provide the greatest benefit to 
those communities that already have greater capacity and commitment to hazard mitigation. As we 
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have seen, both British Columbia and Washington favor Type 1 and Type 4 shared governance 
arrangements, while Washington also has more Type 2 institutions than British Columbia. 
Type 1 arrangements are regulatory full partnerships, which, according to the assumptions 
outlined above, promote local policy-making innovation in all jurisdictions, establishing a policy 
floor in terms of minimum standards. British Columbia mandates planning for emergency response 
and comprehensive planning, as well as requiring some types of development regulation, but does 
not mandate local hazard mitigation planning. As a result, it is expected that most communities will 
have some planning capacity – developed in response to other planning mandates – but that hazard 
mitigation planning will be sporadic and limited to those areas with considerable hazard exposure 
or unrelated, preexisting commitment (such as commitment building by a local champion).  
Washington, in contrast, has a strong comprehensive planning mandate under the GMA, as well as 
state planning and review of local plans in compliance with the federal DMA 2000 mandate for state 
and local hazard mitigation planning. As a result, communities in Washington are expected to have 
considerable planning capacity overall, as well as local policy innovation with regard to hazard 
mitigation.   
  Type 4, “mobilization,” is characterized by limited, voluntary governance arrangements, 
which are expected to facilitate uneven local progress toward state/provincial or federal goals. In 
both British Columbia and Washington, these institutions tend to consist of the administration of 
federal or state/provincial funding programs and (particularly in Washington) the provision of 
educational or technical services. Local governments with high capacity and commitment to hazard 
mitigation are likely to benefit greatly from these programs, but some, particularly smaller, 
communities are likely to fall farther behind.  
 Although the two predominant governance arrangements are the same in British Columbia 
and Washington, it is noteworthy that Washington also has a greater number of Type 2 institutions. 
These voluntary, full partnerships are expected to promote local policy innovation, but to do so 
primarily among those jurisdictions already leading the state in terms of capacity and commitment. 
One example of this is Washington’s Volcano Program, which deals with each of the state’s five 
major volcanoes, and is thus tied most closely to the local jurisdictions with the greatest exposure 
to volcanic hazards. These jurisdictions would be expected to be most involved in the program and 
most innovative with regard to the mitigation of volcanic hazards.  
 The relatively similar distribution of the four types of governance arrangements in British 
Columbia and Washington suggests that some of the same issues with hazard mitigation 
implementation may arise in each place – some degree of local policy innovation throughout the 
province and state, but with the incentive programs being taken advantage of primarily by higher 
capacity communities. Despite these expected similarities, the kind and number of mitigation 
measure implemented in local communities is likely to depend on many things in addition to shared 
governance arrangements, including: socio-economic conditions, political environment, hazard 
exposure and disaster history, and other characteristics. Section four presents four case studies in 
an attempt to identify, in these specific cases, the influence of shared governance arrangements and 
other factors that influence local hazard mitigation implementation. 
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4 .  L O C A L  I M P L E M E N T A T I O N   
While state/provincial and federal agencies have many opportunities to influence local 
decisions, it is local governments that have the authority to implement most natural hazard 
mitigation measures in both Canada and the United States. This section examines case studies of 
how four communities, two in British Columbia and two in Washington, planned for and 
implemented hazard mitigation measures in the last five to ten years. Their hazard mitigation 
records are considered in light of their state/provincial and federal institutional context and shared 
governance arrangements.  
According to the hypothesized effects of shared governance arrangements laid out in 
section three, we would expect find some planning capacity in all four communities, but higher 
hazard mitigation planning capacity in communities in Washington, as a result of their stronger 
Type 1 mandates. We also expect greater policy innovation and implementation in higher capacity 
communities better positioned to take advantage of state/provincial Type 4 programs. Given the 
hypothesized effects of these governance arrangements, two aspects of implementation are of 
particular interest: capacity and innovation. The first, community capacity to plan for and 
implement mitigation measures, is considered in terms of staffing numbers and generalized 
estimates of local funding commitments, as well as the degree of perceived political support for 
hazard mitigation. The second aspect, policy innovation, refers to communities’ abilities to identify 
local issues and policy solutions independently of state/provincial mandates. It is measured here in 
terms of the number of mitigation tools employed, as well whether communities choose to go above 
and beyond mandated requirements. To estimate local policy innovation, I classify mitigation 
measures into fifty five different types of tools that can be divided into ten categories: acquisition & 
elevation; awareness/knowledge; coordination; development incentives; development regulations; 
financial assistance; preparedness/response; protection of public facilities; recovery measures; and 
structural controls (Berke, Smith & Lyles, under review).  I propose that the use of more, different 
tools is indicative of greater policy innovation.  
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The four communities discussed below were selected because each international matched 
pair has a relatively similar hazard environment and demographic characteristics (see Table 2 and 
Figure 10). Two small cities – Port Alberni, B.C. and Mountlake Terrace, WA – were selected, along 
with two larger cities – Richmond, B.C. and Everett, WA. The mitigation tools used by each of these 
four communities are summarized in Table 3, below. More information about the specific measures 
implemented in each category is listed in Appendix II. While we cannot draw causal conclusions 
from these case studies, the comparison provides insights into our hypotheses about the effects of 
shared governance arrangements on local hazard mitigation.  
 
Figure 10. Relative Location of Case Study Cities (Source: GoogleEarth) 
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Table 3. Case Study Implementation of Mitigation Tools by Type 
Mitigation Tool MLT P.A. Everett Richmond Mitigation Tool MLT P.A.  Everett Richmond 
A
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it
io
n
/ 
El
e
va
ti
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n
 
 Elevation of Structures N N Y Y 
 F
in
an
ci
a
l 
A
ss
is
ta
n
ce
 
 Develop Revenue Sources Y N N N 
 Land Acquisition Y N N N State and federal grants Y Y Y Y 
  Structure Acquisition Y N N N Provide $ to property owners N N N N 
 A
w
ar
e
n
e
ss
/ 
K
n
o
w
le
d
ge
 
 Assessment Tools P ? Y Y 
P
re
p
ar
e
d
n
e
ss
/ 
R
e
sp
o
n
se
 
Communications/ Utilities y Y Y Y 
Develop or update data P Y Y Y  Emergency Plans Y Y Y Y 
 Disaster Warning n/a Y Y y  Emergency Response  Y Y Y Y 
 Educational Awareness P Y Y y  Evacuation Y Y Y Y 
 Encourage Insurance Purchase N N N Y Sheltering Y Y Y Y 
 Post Signs n/a Y N N Veg. and Debris Removal Y N Y N 
 Tech Assistance for  Staff N N Y Y 
P
u
b
lic
 
Fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
 
Adjust  Infrastructure N N Y n/a 
 Tech Assistance for Public Y N Y N Retrofit Public Facilities Y Y Y Y 
 Voluntary Real Estate Disclosure Y N Y N Site Public Facilities Y N N n/a 
 C
o
o
rd
in
at
io
n
  County/Region Comp. Plan Y Y Y Y 
R
e
co
ve
ry
 
Building Design Change P N Y Y 
 Horizontal Coordination Y Y Y Y Development Moratorium P N Y N 
 Internal Coordination Y Y Y N Land Use Change P N Y N 
 Municipal Comprehensive Plan Y Y Y Y Post-disaster CIP adjustments P N Y N 
 Vertical Coordination Y Y Y Y Recovery Organization P N Y N 
 In
ce
n
ti
ve
s 
 Density Bonuses N N Y N 
St
ru
ct
u
ra
l 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
Beach Nourishment n/a N Y N 
 Tax Abatement N N Y N Physical Structures N Y Y Y 
 Voluntary Private Retrofitting  N N Y N Storm Water Controls Y Y Y Y 
D
e
ve
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
R
e
gu
la
ti
o
n
s 
Building Standards Y Y Y  Y 
D
e
ve
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
R
e
gu
la
ti
o
n
s(
co
n
t'
d
) 
Permitted Land Use Y N Y n/a 
 Cluster Development Y N Y N Protect Natural Features Y N Y Y 
 Density of Land Use N N Y Y Setbacks or Buffer Zones Y Y Y Y 
 Density Transfer Provision P N Y n/a  Site Review Y Y Y N 
 Floodplain Mgmt Regulation Y Y Y Y  Special Study/ Impact Fees  Y P  Y N 
Freeboard Requirement Y Y Y Y  Subdivision Regulation Y Y Y Y 
Hazards included in Land 
Suitability Analysis Y N Y N Zoning Overlays (hazard) Y N Y n/a 
Mandatory Real Estate Disclosure Y N Y  N           
*Y = yes, tool adopted; N = no, tool not in use; P = plan in place for future use 
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4.1 RICHMOND, B.C.  
About Richmond 
 Richmond, B.C. is part of the Greater Vancouver 
Regional District and lies directly south of Downtown 
Vancouver. As the map in Figure 11 illustrates, Richmond is 
located entirely in the Fraser River Delta. The jurisdiction is 
comprised of 17 islands, the two largest being Lulu Island, 
home to the majority of the city’s 174, 461 inhabitants 
(Census 2006), and Sea Island, home to the Vancouver 
International Airport.    
 Richmond is an incredibly diverse community. 
More than sixty percent of Richmond’s residents are of 
Chinese or South Asian ancestry and Richmond has 
among the highest rates of new immigrants of any jurisdiction in Canada (Statistics Canada).  The 
city is both a residential and an employment center for the Metro Vancouver region. In addition to 
some 64,367 private dwelling units (2006 Census), the city is home to over 135,000 jobs in 
services, retailing, tourism, technology industries, light manufacturing, airport services and 
aviation, agriculture, fishing and government, a jobs to housing ratio of 2.1 (City of Richmond, 
2011).  
Hazards  
Richmond’s location in the Fraser River Delta makes for a distinctive hazard environment. 
The City has identified a number of potential hazards in its Emergency Response Plan, including: 
structural fire, aircraft incidents, dangerous goods, CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, explosive), severe weather, pandemic, flooding, earthquake, and critical infrastructure 
failure (Procter, 2011).  
While the most obvious hazard for a coastal 
island community in the mouth of a major river would 
seem to be flooding, emergency manager Deborah 
Procter (2011) discounts the risk of coastal and riverine 
flooding, emphasizing that localized flooding related to 
storm sewer backups during severe weather events are 
the most pressing flood risk. Although the average 
elevation is only one meter above sea level and all of 
Richmond is effectively in a floodplain, the community 
has great confidence in the system of dykes (Figure 12), 
which totals 49km in length and protects the city’s 
three major islands (Procter, 2011). The dykes 
protecting Lulu Island are owned and maintained by 
the city of Richmond, while those on Sea Island are 
maintained by the Vancouver International Airport Authority, and those protecting the industrial 
parks of Mitchell Island are privately owned and maintained. The dykes are constructed to two feet 
Figure 11. Richmond is located in the Fraser 
River Delta (City of Richmond, 2011) 
 
Figure 12. Richmond Flood Protection 
Dyke. (City of Richmond, 2011) 
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above the highest recorded water level and no flooding has been reported for any of the 12,805 
hectares protected by the system (City of Richmond, 2011). Nevertheless, the risk of coastal or 
riverine flooding does exist, particularly at high tide during an exceptionally large spring freshet.  If 
a dyke were breached – for example, if it were damaged in an earthquake – much of the island 
would be vulnerable to flooding at high tide.  
Like most settlements along the Pacific coast, Richmond is in an area subject to earthquakes. 
Two geographic characteristics that make Richmond particularly vulnerable to earthquakes are the 
alluvial soils of the river delta, which are subject to liquefaction, and the fact that the city is on a 
series of islands and reliant on bridges to connect it to the mainland. The failure of any of its bridges 
during a major earthquake would significantly impair response and recovery efforts. However, 
Richmond’s buildings are expected to perform well in an earthquake, as most are built in 
accordance with the seismic specifications of the National Building Code of Canada (City of 
Richmond). Richmond does not have a significant tsunami risk because Vancouver Island lies 
between it and the open ocean, providing a natural protective barrier.  
Human caused hazards are among the most prevalent and highest priority in the City of 
Richmond (Procter, 2011). These include structural fire, dangerous goods incidents and CBRNE, 
which Procter (2011) defines as “dangerous good, with intent.” Two series of events that may have 
stoked officials’ concern about terrorism include the 2010 winter Olympic Games (the Olympic 
Oval, which housed the Olympic speed skating event, is in Richmond), and a spate of highly 
publicized gang violence in 2009. While human-caused hazards are a significant part of Richmond’s 
emergency management focus, they are beyond the scope of this paper.  As such, the forthcoming 
discussion of planning and hazard mitigation will focus on natural hazards. 
Mitigation Planning in Richmond 
 As discussed in section 3.2, the Province of British Columbia does not require or provide 
incentives for hazard mitigation planning. As a result, the City of Richmond has never prepared a 
mitigation plan. However, the province’s Municipal Act requires local governments to create and 
maintain up to date emergency response plans and Official Community Plans (OCP). The emergency 
management department at the City of Richmond annually updates a general Emergency Response 
Plan, as well as hazard-specific response plans, such as their 2003 Dangerous Goods Spill Response 
Plan. However, none of these response plans address hazard mitigation.  
 The City is currently in the process of updating their growth management strategy – the 
1999 Official Community Plan.  As per the requirements of the Municipal Act, the plan includes a 
“Natural & Human Environment Element” that delineates Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs). 
While these regulations could be used to prevent development of natural hazard areas, in 
Richmond they are all related to habitat and open space preservation, and tied into the goals of the 
regional growth management strategy for the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) – the 
Livable Region Strategic Plan.  While the preservation of shoreline habitat may serve a hazard 
mitigation function, this is not an explicit goal of the ESA designation.  
 The 1999 OCP does contain a few goals and objectives related to hazard mitigation. First, 
one objective is to, “mitigate the public health or environmental hazards resulting from the use or 
development of contaminated sites” (City of Richmond, 1999). Both of the policies addressing this 
objective cite shared governance strategies, namely to “assist the provincial ministry of the 
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environment in administering provincial contaminated sites legislation in Richmond,” and to, “work 
with senior governments to help raise public awareness” (ibid.).  Second, Richmond’s OCP includes 
an entire section on greenhouse gas management, which is mandated by the province.  Local 
governments are required to establish greenhouse gas emissions targets and, in 1999, the City of 
Richmond established targets of 33% below 2007 levels by 2020 and 80% below 2007 levels by 
2050. The OCP (1999) specifies that in order to reach these targets, the city will require assistance 
from the province and other jurisdictions.  
 The OCP update is still going through the city’s public consultation process. In July 2010 the 
planning department released a proposed 2041 OCP vision which focuses on the concept of 
sustainability. The vision states that, in 2041, “the City is responding effectively to the challenges of 
climate change” (City of Richmond, 2010). Although they use the language of response, much more 
prevalent in British Columbia than reference to mitigation, we can only assume that for a low-lying 
island community like Richmond, sustainability in the face of a changing climate (and potential sea 
level rise) will involve hazard mitigation.  
Hazard Mitigation Implementation in Richmond: Moderate Capacity and Innovation 
The City of Richmond Planning Department has a staff of 36, indicating significant planning 
capacity, but this does not include hazard mitigation planning, which is the responsibility of 
Emergency Management. The Emergency Management Office has five staff members and an 
Emergency Social Services volunteer program. Emergency Management has a dedicated budget, but 
this does not usually include hazard mitigation measures, for which the City relies on provincial and 
federal grants. Some of this grant funding comes from the provincial Emergency Preparedness 
Grant, which was cut by 40% in the 2010 fiscal year (Procter, 2011).  Because of these cuts, and the 
general lack of funding for mitigation in British Columbia, Procter (2011) laments that the lack of 
provincial funding limits the projects that the City can implement. Ultimately, argues Procter 
(2011), funding realities mean that natural hazard mitigation is the responsibility of the provincial 
government. This seems to contrary to the devolution of local land use decision making in the 
provincial Municipal Act. However, the language of the OCP (City of Richmond, 1999), which 
emphasizes “assisting the provincial ministry…” and “working with senior governments…” to 
advance hazard mitigation goals reinforces Procter’s (2011) assertion that the City of Richmond 
considers hazard mitigation and recovery the responsibility of the provincial and federal 
government.  
Local oversight of hazard mitigation in Richmond is diffuse, with projects carried out by 
many different city departments (Procter, 2011).  While mitigation related to hazard awareness and 
emergency preparedness falls under the purview of emergency preparedness mandates, the 
Engineering & Public Works, Planning & Development, and Facilities Operations & Maintenance 
departments are responsible for the structural and regulatory mitigation measures. Although 
Richmond has a high level of community capacity for planning and emergency management in 
general, the low priority and diffusion of responsibility for hazard mitigation has lead to a high 
degree of reliance on higher levels of government. 
Despite these limitations, several city departments have implemented hazard mitigation 
measures. As elaborated in Appendix II A, the City of Richmond uses 28 of the 55 types of mitigation 
tools under consideration. In addition to its structural dykes, the categories of tools favored by the 
City of Richmond are “awareness/knowledge” and “emergency preparedness,” which is not 
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surprising given the City and the province’s policy emphasis on preparedness.  Because of the 
unique geography of the city, emergency manager Deborah Procter (2011) explains that levels of 
exposure to all of its major natural hazards are relatively uniform throughout the city of Richmond.  
Since development cannot be re-located to avoid hazard areas, this uniformity of exposure limits 
the effectiveness of land-use based mitigation tools.  Overall, Richmond exhibits moderate levels of 
community capacity and policy innovation with regard to natural hazard mitigation.  
4.2 EVERETT, WA 
About Everett 
 Everett, WA is a city of 98,212 (ACS 2005-2009) on Port 
Gardner Bay (see Figure 13). It is located on Interstate 5, about 
25 miles north of Seattle, WA and 100 miles south of Richmond, 
B.C. It is the seat of Snohomish County and a member of the 
Puget Sound Regional Council. Nestled along the Puget Sound, 
near the Olympic and Cascade mountains, Everett is a gateway 
to many outdoor adventure and tourism destinations.  
Like Richmond, Everett is a regional center for both 
housing and employment, with a jobs-to-household 
ratio of 1.7 in 2000 (City of Everett, 2004). Major 
employment sectors are technology, aerospace, and 
services, with the major employers being the Boeing Company, Naval Station Everett, and the 
city and county governments (City of Everett, 2004). Everett is home to the world’s largest 
building by volume – the Boeing manufacturing facility that is home to the 747, 767, 777, 787, 
and “Dreamliner” production lines – as well as the largest public marina on the west coast.  
Hazards 
 According to the Everett Hazard Mitigation Plan (2006), the natural hazards that pose 
the greatest risk to the city as a whole are landslides, severe weather, and flooding. Fire, 
earthquake, and hazardous materials are also a moderate concern. Severe weather was the 
cause of most hazard damage in recent years (Salmon, 2011). 
Figure 13. Everett, WA (www.bestplaces.net) 
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Several areas of the city have been 
identified as being particularly at risk to 
multiple hazards (see figure 14). The first 
multi-hazard area is the West Mukilteo 
Boulevard Corridor. The combination of 
steep slopes and soft soils exposes this 
residential area to seismic and landslide 
hazards, a series of ravines increases the 
interface fire risk. A railway running 
through the corridor adds the potential for 
a hazardous material incident, and the area 
is also in the Puget Sound tsunami hazard 
area (City of Everett, 2006). The Southeast 
Everett Ridge also has soft soils, steep 
slopes, and the railway-related hazardous 
materials exposure. This area is also home 
to ten of the city’s critical facilities (ibid.). 
The Delta Northeast multi-hazard zone is 
vulnerable to many of the same hazards as 
the Southeast Everett Ridge. A specific 
vulnerability is the storage of hazardous 
materials in a rail yard which lies on soils 
prone to liquefaction. The Everett 
Waterfront is at risk of earthquake, 
landslide, tsunami, severe weather, and 
hazardous materials events. One major 
concern is that the main access to the 
area relies on a bridge which is built on 
seismically vulnerable soils (ibid.). Finally, Central Everett is flatter but still vulnerable to 
earthquakes and to landslides along its western side, home to the city’s greatest commercial 
concentration.   
Hazard Mitigation Planning in Everett 
 The City of Everett adopted its FEMA approved Hazard Mitigation Plan in 2006, 
maintaining its compliance with the federal DMA 2000. According to the plan, the city b elieves 
that “careful, long-term pre-disaster planning can help to reduce the impacts of natural hazards 
and increase a community’s resilience through planning, awareness and implementation of 
mitigation actions” (City of Everett, 2006, 1). A five year update, mandated by FEMA, is currently 
underway and in its public consultation phase. The 2006 plan includes discussion of the 
regulatory background, planning process, goals and objective, mitigation and implementation 
strategies, and plan maintenance (City of Everett, 2006). In the 2011 plan, unmet objectives 
will be re-evaluated and possibly carried forward, while new priorities and objectives will be 
incorporated based on new information and public input (Salmon, 2011).   
 City staff of the City of Everett also prepares a Comprehensive Plan in compliance with the 
Washington GMA, which they are required to update every ten years. The most recent plan was 
Figure 14. Multi-hazard Areas in Everett, WA (City of Everett, 2006, 14) 
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adopted in 2004, with amendments in 2010. This plan includes a Shoreline Land Use Element, 
which is really a plan-within-a-plan, and an update of the 1976 Shoreline Master Program. This 
Element’s “Flood Hazard Reduction Element,” includes the goal: “to prevent or minimize flood 
damage while protecting shoreline ecological functions and ecosystem-wide processes” (City of 
Everett, 2004). Five objectives address this goal: discourage new development in shoreline areas; 
evaluate and prevent flood damages; update floodplain development regulations; minimize flood-
protection impacts on shoreline ecological functions; and choose non-structural over structural 
mitigation measures when possible (ibid.). These objectives are related to a series of policy 
measures, though these measures are much less specific and less action-oriented than the policies 
recommended in the City of Everett Hazard Mitigation Plan (2006).  
 According to Homeland Security Planner Dara Salmon (2011), the current, process-based 
state and federal mandates strike a good balance by requiring hazard mitigation planning but 
leaving specific implementation measures up to local government. While recognizing the benefits of 
hazard mitigation planning, the City of Everett Planning Department undertakes it primarily as a 
means to maintain their eligibility for state and federal funds, without which many of their large 
mitigation measures would not be feasible (Salmon, 2011).  
Hazard Mitigation Implementation in Everett: High Capacity and Innovation 
 The City of Everett employs 17 planning and 3 emergency management staff. As in 
Richmond, responsibility for the implementation of mitigation projects is spread among 
several departments, including Engineering & Public Works, Everett Transit, Facilities, and 
Fire. However, contrary to Richmond, the Everett, the Emergency Preparedness division, 
housed within the Fire Department, is tasked with coordinating and monitoring mitigation 
projects across departments, as well as maintaining the hazard mitigation plan. This 
demonstrates Everett’s willingness to accept and embrace local responsibility for hazard 
mitigation. While it is not championed to the extent of emergency preparedness, Salmon 
(2011) emphasizes that there is considerable political support for mitigation in the City of 
Everett.  
This support has paid off in terms of implementation. Of the 16 mitigation objectives 
adopted in the 2006 plan, 12 were completed (or ongoing) by 2011 (Salmon, 2011). This 
makes it clear that the City of Everett Hazard Mitigation Plan is not merely an administrative 
exercise meant to secure funding – the city is serious about implementation and has the 
capacity to follow through on its adopted policy recommendations.  While the City sought 
grant funds to support the implementation of larger projects, the costs of small projects, as 
well as a substantial portion of planning costs, were covered by City budgets (Salmon, 2011).  
The combination of internal coordination and the willingness to dedicate local funds to 
implementation suggests that Everett is a high capacity community with regard to hazard 
mitigation.  
The City of Everett uses 46 of the 55 tools under consideration (See Figure 3 and Appendix II B 
for details). This diversity of tools indicates a propensity for policy innovation. Like Richmond, 
they use a lot of awareness and preparedness-related tools. However, they have also adopted 
extensive development regulations and incentives to promote hazard mitigation. Part of the 
difference between the two cities may be related to geography. While a uniform hazard 
environment renders land use tools relatively ineffective in Richmond, Everett’s highly 
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differentiated topography, with lots of localized slopes, ravines, and differing elevations make 
it a prime candidate for land-use based interventions. However, state policies that encourage 
local governments to take responsibility for hazard mitigation in Washington may also 
contribute to the wide range of policies adopted.  
4.3 PORT ALBERNI, B.C. 
About Port Alberni 
 Port Alberni is a waterfront community 
of about 17,500 on the west coast of Vancouver 
Island, B.C. This small city is the regional center 
of the rugged and beautiful Alberni Valley. It is 
bounded on the west by Alberni Inlet, Somass 
Estuary and Somass River, and to the east 
Mount Arrowsmith (see Figure 15). With a 
median income of $43,634, Port Alberni trailed 
the provincial average of $52,709 by 13% in 
2005 (Statistics Canada, Census 2006). This 
may be due to the large proportion of retirees 
in the City. The percent of the population over 
65 is about 3% higher than the provincial 
average (City of Port Alberni, 2007). The 
population of Port Alberni is aging, both as current residents age and because the city seems to 
becoming a popular retirement destination. While not a tourist destination itself, Port Alberni 
is expanding its tourism industry and positioning itself as a gateway and service center for 
more popular destinations, like the Pacific Rim National Park and Clayoquot Sound (City of 
Port Alberni, 2011b).  
 The economy of Port Alberni, traditionally dependent on resource extraction (primarily 
forestry and fishing, has diversified to include a developing service sector and tourism 
industry. Nevertheless, the city has struggled to maintain its commercial and employment base 
over the past two decades (City of Port Alberni, 2007).  A poorly performing economy is one 
impediment to natural hazard mitigation in Port Alberni (Smith, 2011).  
Hazards 
 The main hazards addressed in the Port Alberni OCP (2005) are the tsunami threat and 
general riverine and coastal flooding.  City planner Scott Smith (2011) identified wind and 
flooding as the most common hazards affecting the community, though he also identifies a risk 
of wildland interface fires along the several ravines that cut though the community, as well as 
the earthquake and volcano risks that are ubiquitous along much of the Pacific coast.    
 Port Alberni is one of few Canadian cities to have been severely damaged by a tsunami. 
The earthquake that struck Alaska on March 27, 1964 caused a tsunami that affected much of 
the west coast of Canada and the United States. The tsunami was amplified as it was funneled 
up the Alberni inlet (City of Port Alberni, 2011). A first, smaller wave (eight feet above normal 
Figure 15. Port Alberni, B.C. (City of Port Alberni, 2011) 
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high tide) is said to have alerted the population and given them time to escape the larger wave 
(10 feet above normal high tide) that struck about an hour later (BCDC, 1964).  Four more six -
foot waves pounded the inlet during the course of a surge that lasted approximately 18 hours 
(ibid.). Though it caused considerable property damage (see Figure 16), no lives were lost 
anywhere on Vancouver Island (ibid.). As a result of 
this hazard experience, Port Alberni has developed a 
tsunami mitigation plan and installed the only tsunami 
warning system of its kind in British Columbia – a 
siren-based warning system that activates an 
established evacuation plan (City of Port Alberni, 2011; 
Smith, 2011). According to Smith (2011), residents of 
Port Alberni have followed the aftermath of the 
earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan March 11, 
2011 with particular interest, and with renewed 
commitment to local hazard mitigation.   
Hazard Mitigation Planning in Port Alberni 
 Like Richmond, Port Alberni is not required to and has not prepared a hazard 
mitigation plan, but does maintain an Emergency Response Plan and an Official Community 
Plan (OCP). Also like Richmond, the Emergency Response Plan does not address mitigation 
measures, but they are addressed in a cursory way in the OCP. However, the plan includes only 
one paragraph on natural hazards, with two policy recommendations: “maintain and update 
the Tsunami Floodplain Management Strategy as necessary…” and “encourage agricultural, 
park and open space recreational uses of flood susceptible lands” (City of Port Alberni, 2005). 
Although, like most comprehensive plans, the OCP is a policy and not a regulatory document, 
land use decisions in Port Alberni are required to be consistent with the Plan’s policy 
recommendations (City of Port Alberni, 2005).  
Hazard Mitigation Implementation in Port Alberni: Low Capacity and Moderate Innovation 
 Since it is a small, economically depressed city, Port Alberni has a very small city staff. 
The single city planner, Scott Smith, is also the subdivision approving officer and works closely 
with the city’s only engineer. While this facilitates internal coordination and integration of 
mitigation concerns into all City functions, it also results in limited community capacity. 
Staffing and funding constraints limit the City’s ability to implement the more complex 
mitigation tools (such as density transfer programs) and also limit monitoring and 
enforcement when regulatory measures are adopted. Political support for hazard mitigation in 
Port Alberni is also limited – largely as a result of financial constraints and competing 
priorities (Smith, 2011). While there is some support for mitigation projects, support is far 
from unanimous. For example, in 2011 the City Council approved funds for a preliminary study 
for drainage improvements to Dry Creek, but the resolution was highly contested.  
Smith (2011) asserts that the province plays a critical role in funding hazard mitigation 
projects, but believes that they could do much more. For example, he is critical of the 
province’s decision to devolve subdivision regulation and oversight in 2003 (Smith, 2011). 
Since the province’s 2003 adoption of the Flood Hazard Statutes Amendment Act, he has take 
Figure 16. Damage to Port Alberni from the  
1964 Tsunami. (City of Port Alberni, 2011) 
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on responsibility for subdivision approvals for Port Alberni and says that, among his peers in 
other small communities, capacity to fulfill this new responsibility is often lacking (ibid.).  “The 
province brought a lot of expertise to the table that a lot of smaller communities just don’t 
have,” laments Smith (2011).  
 Intuitively, lower levels of community capacity, relative to larger, more prosperous 
centers like Richmond, should translate into less implementation and policy innovation. 
However, the City of Port Alberni still manages to implement most of the tools used by the City 
of Richmond. The City of Port Alberni uses 24 of the 55 mitigation tools of interest, compared 
to Richmond’s 28 (see Appendix II C for details). This might be attributable to the fact that 
Richmond’s emergency manager (Procter, 2011) only acknowledged those mitigation tools 
that are formalized, while Port Alberni’s planner (Smith, 2011) insisted that many of the tools 
are used, if only informally. For example, while Port Alberni does not have an official critical 
facility siting policy, Smith (2011) insisted that, based on staff discretion, a critical facility 
would never be built in a tsunami hazard area or floodplain. Because the small staff jointly and 
consistently oversees every development proposal, many mitigation tools, particularly the 
development regulations, are considered implicit in Port Alberni and this was accepted as 
implementation in Table 3.  Also, like Everett and unlike Richmond, Port Alberni is in a 
location where hazard exposure is localized and development regulations can be used 
effectively to reduce risk. In conclusion, though they are low capacity, Port Alberni performs 
surprisingly well with regard to mitigation policy implementation and innovation.  
4.4. MOUNTLAKE TERRACE, WA 
About Mountlake Terrace  
Mountlake Terrace is a small city of approximately 
15,000 (ACS 2005-2009) located on Lake Ballinger, near 
Puget Sound, ten miles north of Seattle, WA (see Figure 17). It 
is located in southern Snohomish County and is a member of 
the Puget Sound Regional Council. Mountlake Terrace is built 
around Lake Ballinger and bisected by Interstate 5, which 
runs north-south through the community.  
The City of Mountlake Terrace is described as a 
“mixed use” community in its Comprehensive Plan, and has a 
jobs to housing ratio of 0.81 (City of Mountlake Terrace, 
2010). Major employers in Mountlake Terrace include 
Premera Blue Cross of Washington and Alaska, Puget 
Sound Christian College, and the U.S. Forest Service (ibid.). 
Despite the fact that economic growth has been slow since 
the 1980s, as the town nears build-out, development pressure is pushing development into 
hazardous areas where hazard constraints have previously made land uneconomical to develop 
(Mountlake Terrace, 2010).  
 
Figure 17. Mountlake Terrace and Lake 
Ballinger. (City of Mountlake Terrace, 2011) 
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Hazards 
 Mountlake Terrace’s 2010 Hazard Mitigation Plan Update identifies the following ten 
hazards, in descending order of risk (likelihood + vulnerability): earthquake; landslide; urban 
flooding; severe storm; drought; 100-year flood; volcano; dam burst; wildland urban interface fire; 
and tsunami/seiche. Earthquakes are a significant hazard, as the city is located between several 
fault lines and small earthquakes occur almost daily. City Hall was damaged in the 2001 Nisqually 
Earthquake and required repairs and seismic retrofits. There is also a danger that traffic flow on 
Interstate-5, which passes through the center of the city, could be interrupted if an earthquake 
were to cause major damage to bridges and overpasses (ESCA, 2010). 
 While Mountlake Terrace does not have any major rivers flowing through or near it, flood 
risk comes from Lake Ballinger, the Cedar Way Detention Dam, wetland and streams, and 75 miles 
of stormwater piping.  The city’s stormwater infrastructure is prone to failure in the event of 
excessive rainfall or snowmelt, creating an urban flooding problem that is exacerbated by 
increasing impervious cover as the community grows (ESCA, 2010). There are many steep slopes in 
Mountlake Terrace which, despite the landslide hazard, have proven attractive places for 
residential development. Many of these homes would be vulnerable to landslides, particularly in 
conjunction with an earthquake, and/or with storm-induced saturation of the soils or undercutting 
of the banks (ESCA, 2010). Just such a slide occurred in 1997, costing the City approximately 
$300,000 for street reconstruction and safety improvements (ibid.).     
Planning in Mountlake Terrace 
“Natural hazard mitigation plans assist communities in identifying the hazards that could impact them, 
determining the vulnerability of the community to these hazards, and identifying mitigation strategies to 
prevent or reduce the impacts these hazards pose to the community through a coordinated, multi-
jurisdictional approach.” 
- North King and South Snohomish Counties Regional Mitigation Plan (2004, I-4) 
 
 Mountlake Terrace is in compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) 2000 local 
hazard mitigation planning requirement. Rather than preparing their own stand alone mitigation 
plan, the City participates in a multi-jurisdictional planning effort between the North King and 
South Snohomish Counties.  The regional planning process is coordinated by the regional 
Emergency Services Coordinating Agency (ESCA) and serves ten jurisdictions- seven municipalities 
and three special districts. This type of collaboration is beneficial to small communities with limited 
staff like Mountlake Terrace because it provides staff and technical support at the regional level. 
However, while the Paula Schwartz, the city planner, is required to provide a wide variety of local 
data for a jurisdiction-specific element (Schwartz, 2011), the hazard assessment is done at the 
regional level and is likely to suffer from the problem identified in the Washington State Hazard 
Mitigation Plan (2010) – over-reliance on state and regional technical expertise at the expense of 
locally specific hazard analysis.  Public participation in the hazard mitigation planning process at 
the local level was also lacking, despite the efforts of the local Planning Department (Schwartz, 
2011). While both ESCA and Mount Lake Terrace held several public meetings and information 
sessions in order to meet the public participation requirements of the DMA 2000, no one from 
Mountlake Terrace attended any of these sessions (ibid.). As noted in Section 1, this is a common 
problem with hazard mitigation planning (Godschalk et al., 2003).  
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 The Mountlake Terrace City Comprehensive Plan also addresses natural hazards in a limited 
fashion and relevant policies are incorporated by reference in the jurisdiction-specific element of 
the Hazard Mitigation Plan. For example, the City Comprehensive Plan “encourages the retention of 
natural features of the land and minimizes impacts to steep slopes” (ESCA, 2010, 268). This type of 
integration of the two plans is beneficial because, while the hazard mitigation plan only makes it 
onto the local agenda during the mandated five-year updates (Schwartz, 2011), the Comprehensive 
Plan was the product of a more intensive local public process and in likely to be incorporated into 
public decision making on a more regular basis.  
Hazard Mitigation Implementation in Mountlake Terrace:  Moderate Capacity and Innovation 
Like Port Alberni, Mountlake Terrace is a small city with limited resources and staff. 
Mitigation planning is but one of many duties of the planning staff of two, though the plan 
update process, mandated by the DMA 2000, is supported by regional staff at ESCA. The City 
has no emergency management budget and mitigation projects, including planning, are 
dependent on the receipt of state and federal grants (Schwartz, 2011). Schwartz (2011) 
identifies the community’s dependence on state and federal funding as a limitation on the 
implementation of mitigation measures in Mountlake Terrace. 
Like Salmon (2011) in the City of Everett, Schwartz (2011) supports the State of 
Washington’s process-based planning mandate, saying that “everyone should be required to 
have a hazard mitigation plan – but every jurisdiction should be in charge of how they want to 
implement it” (Schwartz, 2011). In contrast to Port Alberni, Schwartz (2011) emphasizes 
unanimous political support for mitigation, despite limited public interest. She emphasizes the 
value of the planning process for increasing the awareness of the City Council about hazard 
exposure and vulnerability – particularly with regard to critical facilities (ibid.). The concentration 
of all the hazard information in one place makes the implantation of policy recommendations more 
likely (ibid.). 
Perhaps because of this political support, despite its relatively low capacity, the City of 
Mountlake Terrace has implemented quite a lot of hazard mitigation measures. As shown in Table 
3, the City uses 33 of the 55 tools under consideration (five more than the much larger city of 
Richmond) and outlines plans to implement many more tools in their Hazard Mitigation Plan 
(ESCA, 2010) (see Appendix II D for details). The City has implemented most of the coordination, 
and development regulation, and preparedness tools, and plans to expand their use of awareness 
and recovery planning tools (see Table 3). According to Schwartz (2011), the City exceeds state 
requirements by updating all of the data in their mitigation plan every five years, rather than only 
the data specified by ESCA and FEMA requirements.  Based on their implementation record, 
Mountlake Terrace exhibits a moderate degree of policy implementation and innovation.  
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4.5 DISCUSSION  
Capacity and Policy Innovation by the Numbers 
 
The findings of these case studies 
generally support the hypotheses 
proposed at the beginning of this section: 
that a policy floor established by Type 1 
(full regulatory) relationships leads to 
some planning and mitigation capacity in 
all communities, but that stronger 
mandates in Washington promote more mitigation implementation; and that communities with 
greater capacity exhibit more local policy innovation and benefit disproportionately from Type 4 
programs. Indeed, these two Washington communities do appear to have greater hazard mitigation 
capacity than their Canadian peers. They have created more plans, employ more planning staff (two 
in Mountlake Terrace; one in Port Alberni), report greater political support for hazard mitigation 
projects, and dedicate at least some local funds to planning and implementation while the British 
Columbia communities rely exclusively on grants (Salmon, 2011; Schwartz, 2011). They also show 
signs of greater policy innovation – that is, they use more different mitigation tools than 
communities in British Columbia (see Table 4). The small city in Washington (Mountlake Terrace) 
even uses more tools than the large British Columbia city (Richmond), despite the fact that the 
latter has much greater staff and resources. However, when we compare cities within the same 
state or province, we see that the large (and higher capacity) cities perform better than the small 
(lower capacity) cities.  
 A few patterns can be deciphered from the local implementation summary in Table 
3. For each category of tools that follows, the numbers in parentheses indicate the number of times 
that type of tool was implemented in the United States and Canada, respectively12. For financial 
reasons, acquisition and elevation (3, 1) are unpopular across the board. Awareness and knowledge 
building tools (9, 10) are generally widely used, as they are relatively cost effective and some are 
are mandatory under the Washington GMA and DMA 2000. However, technical assistance is not 
provided by either of the local communities in British Columbia, likely because it is considered to be 
the responsibility of higher levels of government (Procter, 2011). All communities self-identify 
positively with regard to coordination (9, 10). However, coordination mechanisms tend to be more 
informal in British Columbia than in Washington (Procter, 2011; Smith, 2011). Incentives (3, 0) are 
not used by any of the communities except Everett, WA, which exceeds the other three communities 
in terms of both mitigation capacity and policy innovation. The implementation of development 
regulations (28, 13) is mixed. Regulation is used more often in Washington. However, this could be 
                                                             
10 (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, under review) 
11Source of population numbers for WA: ACS 2005-2009; Source for B.C.: 2006 Census 
12 (# tools in Cat. X used in US community A) + (# tools in Cat. X used in US community B), (# tools in Cat. X used in CDN 
community A) + (# tools in Cat. X used in CDN community B) 
Table 4. Mitigation Policy Implementation 
City Policy Types10 Population11 
Mountlake Terrace, WA 33 20,019 (sm) 
Port Alberni, B.C.  24 17,548 (sm) 
Everett, WA 46 98,212 (lg) 
Richmond, B.C.  28 174,461 (lg) 
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related to the geography of the case study communities. Regulation is used infrequently in 
Richmond because it is not very effective given the community’s uniform hazard exposure (Procter, 
2011). All four communities are strong in terms of preparedness and response (12, 10). This is 
likely because the subject has more public and political support than mitigation (Salmon, 2011; 
Smith, 2011), and because emergency response planning is mandated in British Columbia. All of the 
communities are in the process of seismically retrofitting public facilities. However, long term 
facilities and infrastructure planning is less common (4, 2). Everett is the only community to have 
begun using mitigation tools related to long-term recovery (5, 1). This is a relatively new policy 
area that Mountlake Terrace hopes to begin implementing in the next mitigation planning cycle 
(Schwartz, 2011). Finally, structural controls (4, 4) are widely used and supported in all of the 
communities. The City of Everett Comprehensive Plan (2004) recognizes the environmental 
damage caused by structural controls and explicitly gives preference to non-structural mitigation 
techniques. While uncommon in practice, this position is in line with prevailing scientific and 
academic findings about environmental degradation and the safe development paradox discussed 
in Section II (Birkland et al., 2003; Burby 2006; Godschalk, 1999). However, this reality has not yet 
overcome the political expediency of structural protections.  
Policy Lessons  
While the quantitative findings above reveal differences in capacity and policy innovation 
between the Washington and British Columbia communities, qualitative analyses of the case studies 
can help us understand some of the reasons behind these differences. International comparisons of 
case study communities highlight three strengths of hazard mitigation arrangements in 
Washington: local political support, technical support, and coordination. Based on these strengths, 
we can draw lessons for hazard mitigation policy in Canada. 
Emergency management professionals in both Washington communities perceived 
unqualified political support for local hazard mitigation projects (Salmon, 2011; Schwartz, 2011). 
North of the border, mitigation was not perceived as a municipal responsibility in Richmond 
(Procter, 2011) and it received only limited support in Port Alberni (Smith, 2011). One reason that 
mitigation is less politically contentious in Washington may be because the United States has 
several mitigation-specific grant programs (like FEMA’s PDM and HMGP), while in Canada 
mitigation projects must compete for funds with other emergency management and general 
infrastructure priorities.  As mentioned in the Section 2 discussion of the shared governance 
dilemmas, when municipalities are faced with multiple demands for scarce resources, hazard 
mitigation often loses out to other, more immediate local needs. If the Canadian federal or 
provincial government were to develop more funding programs aimed specifically at hazard 
mitigation, local decision makers would no longer perceive grant applications as a zero-sum game 
in which more mitigation projects mean less resources for other infrastructure and facilities. By 
taking mitigation out of competition with more politically salient infrastructure projects (like filling 
potholes), the government would bolster local political support. While additional funds should 
make this recommendation even more effective, it need not entail the dedication of additional 
funds. Even earmarking a certain proportion of existing funding programs, like the Emergency 
Preparedness Grant or the Canada/British Columbia Municipal Rural Infrastructure Fund, for 
hazard mitigation would improve the political feasibility of mitigation projects.  
Based on key informant interviews, the planning staff members in Everett and Mountlake 
Terrace feel that they have a greater degree of intergovernmental technical support than their 
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counterparts in British Columbia. The planner from Mountlake Terrace was very pleased with the 
technical support and guidance the community receives from the regional emergency coordinator 
at ESCA. Meanwhile, in Port Alberni, Smith (2011) bemoaned the lack of technical support for 
smaller communities. The devolution of decision making authority and imposition of Type 1 
planning requirements are most effective if they are accompanied by sufficient technical support 
and capacity building. As mentioned in Section III, the Type 4 programs that tend to provide this 
sort of technical and financial support are often more accessible to larger centers that need them 
the least. Targeted assistance and capacity building would enable small communities to make the 
most of their local decision making authority. This could be accomplished by following the example 
of ESCA in Washington and strengthening regional governance. Targeted technical (Type 4) 
assistance could be provided at the Regional District level or, at a larger scale, through the 
Provincial Emergency Program’s six regions.  
The third and final policy issue is internal coordination at the local level. Scott Smith in Port 
Alberni epitomizes the small city planner – he is a generalist who is required to wear many hats 
(planner, emergency manager, subdivision approving officer…). In the context of a small 
community, this kind of multi-tasking has the advantage of allowing the hazard-aware staff member 
to integrate hazard mitigation practices into many aspects of governmental decision making. And, 
since it is easy for all or many of the city staff to get together on a regular basis, internal 
coordination can occur informally (Smith, 2011). However, in larger communities, it is much more 
difficult for staff to communicate across departmental or agency boundaries.  While this “stove-
piping” of information is a general problem that affects many aspects of government, it is 
particularly problematic emergency management in Canada because there are no formal 
mechanisms for internal coordination. In Richmond, for example, emergency manager Deborah 
Procter (2011) was completely unaware of what mitigation measures were being implemented in 
Engineering & Public Works or other departments, let alone by private utility providers. This lack of 
coordination hampers the implementation of hazard mitigation measures in several ways. For 
example, it prevents departments from achieving multiple goals by “piggy backing” off projects in 
other departments and it also hinders effective priority setting and monitoring efforts.    
In comparison, in the study communities in Washington, formal coordination mechanisms 
foster internal coordination. The Everett Emergency Management division, housed within the Fire 
Department, is tasked with the coordination of hazard mitigation planning and implementation 
across all City departments. According to Salmon (2011), one of their explicit goals is to foster 
collaborations that achieve multiple goals. For example, the Everett Transit Agency is working with 
the Emergency Management Agency on a traffic study and signal prioritization system that could 
not only improve traffic flows, but could also be used to facilitate the travel of emergency vehicles 
or a mass evacuation (Salmon, 2011). In the smaller community of Mountlake Terrace, internal 
coordination tends to happen informally, like in Port Alberni, but horizontal coordination between 
jurisdictions is fostered formally through ESCA. British Columbia need to overcome internal stove-
piping in order to mainstream hazard mitigation practices at the local, regional and provincial 
levels.  
In conclusion, qualitative evaluation of four international case studies reveals three areas 
where local and provincial governments in British Columbia can learn from their counterparts in 
Washington. Local political support for mitigation can be bolstered by creating mitigation-specific 
funding streams that take hazard mitigation out of competition with other priorities. Improved 
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technical assistance can be provided to local governments through either existing regional 
organizations or provincial agencies. And finally, coordination can be fostered by formalizing 
channels for internal communication about hazard mitigation activities.  
5 .  C O N C LU S I O N  &  RE C O M M E N D A T I O N S   
 This comparative analysis has reviewed hazard mitigation institutions and governance 
arrangements at three levels – federal policy, state/provincial legislation and programs, and local 
implementation. At the federal level, the United States have a much more explicit mitigation policy 
than Canada, where emergency management policy is focused on preparedness and response 
(Henstra et al., 2004; Henstra & McBean, 2005; Hwacha, 2005). The U.S. mitigation policy 
framework, the DMA 2000, requires hazard mitigation planning at both the state and local level as a 
condition for federal emergency assistance funds. This federal mandate has generated considerable 
mitigation planning capacity at lower levels of government. In contrast, the Canadian National 
Disaster Mitigation Strategy (2008) provides a framework for how levels of government can work 
together to meet mitigation goals, but does not establish any desired outcomes, requirements, or 
standards and, as of yet, has had no discernable impact on lower levels of government. Despite 
these differences, many similar policy themes arise in the hazard mitigation literature from the 
United States and Canada, including: structural mitigation and the safe development paradox; 
challenges of shared governance; federal policies that distort risk; and the importance of local 
capacity. Federal policy issues differ however, with regard to the political salience of disaster and 
the degree of federal involvement in mitigation.  
 Analysis of state and provincial legislation and programs reveal that, similar to the federal 
level, the State of Washington deals explicitly with mitigation, while in British Columbia mitigation 
it is dealt with tangentially, as a secondary function of preparedness and response driven 
institutions. For example, Washington both implements the state-level requirements of the DMA 
2000 and establishes additional planning and regulation requirements under its Growth 
Management Act. In British Columbia, hazard mitigation is overseen by the Provincial Emergency 
Program, though this program deals primarily with preparedness and response. One similarity 
between the two jurisdictions is that, in both places, mitigation functions are fragmented and 
divided between multiple departments and agencies. Another similarity is the preferred type of 
governance arrangements. Perhaps because of the similar divisions of power under Canadian and 
American federal systems, Washington and British Columbia both engage in predominantly Type 1 
(full partnership) and Type 4 (mobilization) governance arrangements. While the Type 1 planning 
mandates in Washington, reinforced by the federal DMA 2000 planning mandates, are stronger and 
more directly related to hazard mitigation than the emergency response planning mandate in 
British Columbia, both have implications for local capacity for mitigation planning and 
implementation.  
 Local hazard mitigation implementation in the four case study communities varies between 
Washington and British Columbia and between the small and large cities. Strong, bottom up, full 
partnerships with the state government have fostered considerable hazard mitigation planning and 
implementation capacity in Everett, WA, and strong capacity relative to its size in Mountlake 
Terrace, WA. Both Everett and Mountlake Terrace also exhibit a great deal of policy innovation, as 
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they implement a wide variety of different hazard mitigation tools (46 and 33 respectively). Despite 
the best efforts of a competent staff, the communities in British Columbia display less mitigation 
capacity and policy innovation than their American counterparts. I attribute this to their weaker 
intergovernmental relationships with the provincial and federal governments and make the 
following three recommendations. First, I recommend that provincial funding streams for hazard 
mitigation be added or differentiated from more general funding programs, in order to increase 
local political support for hazard mitigation. Second, I suggest that the province develop improved 
technical assistance for local governments, particularly in the event of the devolution of formerly 
provincial priorities to local jurisdictions. These technical support programs could be implemented 
at the regional level, as they are in Washington. Finally, I recommend formalizing mechanisms for 
internal coordination at both the local and the provincial level, based on the successful model of the 
local emergency management agency/organization in Washington. 
Perhaps at its heart, the problem is that hazard mitigation has not been fully 
institutionalized in Canada the way that it is in the United States. Given the current institutional 
void around mitigation, it is easy for actors at every level of government in Canada to assume that 
mitigation is not their responsibility. Local governments suffer from shared governance dilemmas 
and moral hazard problems – assuming that higher levels of government will swoop in to save the 
day in the event of a disaster. Meanwhile, the Government of British Columbia devolves 
responsibility to municipal governments without ensuring that all local governments have the 
capacity to implement their new mandates. The federal National Disaster Mitigation Strategy might 
be the first step in carefully defining the roles and relationships of multiple levels of government in 
Canada with regard to hazard mitigation. However, with neither regulatory teeth nor federal 
leadership, the policy document is not likely to succeed in shaping intergovernmental relationships 
in Canada in the way that the DMA 2000 has in the United States. While it seems very basic and 
implicit in the federal division of constitutional authority, I suggest that the federal and provincial 
governments in Canada need to reaffirm the local responsibility for hazard mitigation. Once these 
governance arrangements are clarified, the country can move toward the establishment of more 
direct and effective hazard mitigation institutions that bolster local capacity.  
On the basis of these case studies, my primary recommendation for mitigation policy in the 
United States is to safeguard the institutions and clearly defined intergovernmental relationships 
that are already in place. In the current climate of budget cuts and partisan politics, it is easy to 
conceive of programs like the PDM and HMGP going the way of Project Impact. However, these 
federal programs are important to intergovernmental commitment and capacity building and the 
preceding case studies attest to their effectiveness in motivating local hazard mitigation planning 
and enabling local implementation. While this is not to say that the current governance 
arrangements in the United States are perfect, they are more effective than the absence of hazard 
mitigation institutions in Canada. In both the United States and Canada, devising and maintaining 
effective intergovernmental relationships will play an important role in building strong and 
resilient communities able to adapt and thrive in the face of natural hazards. 
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A P P E N D I X  I  
A. KEY INFORMANTS 
City of Richmond, B.C. 
Name: Deborah Procter 
Title: Emergency Manager 
Interview Date: March 3, 2011 
 
City of Port Alberni, B.C. 
Name: Scott Smith 
Title: City Planner 
Interview Date: March 17, 2011 
 
City of Everett, WA 
Name: Dara Salmon 
Title: Homeland Security Planner 
Interview Date: March 14, 2011 
 
City of Mountlake Terrace, WA 
Name: Paula Schwartz 
Title: City Planner 
Interview Date: March 2, 2011 
 
B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Hazard Mitigation Institutions and Implementation: Interview Questions 
There are two parts to this set of interview questions. The first part is contains objective questions 
about hazards and the hazard mitigation measures that your community has implemented or plans to 
implement. The second part includes subjective questions about your perception of your community’s 
attitudes toward hazards and hazard mitigation. At any point, you are free to not answer a question 
or to discontinue the interview.  
 
The purpose of this study is to determine how federal and provincial institutions and governance 
arrangements influence hazard mitigation projects and programs in your community. As such, when 
discussing hazard mitigation activities, please indicate the role of the federal, provincial, and local 
governments in each activity – for example, is it mandated, funded, or are incentives provided by the 
provincial or federal government – or is it a result of local initiative?  
 
Part I 
1. What are the main hazards (natural and man-made) that affect your community? 
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2. What are the most damaging hazard events that have affected your jurisdiction in the past five 
years? 
 
3. What hazard mitigation measures have your jurisdiction implemented in the past five years? For 
each activity please describe the role of the federal and provincial government, if applicable. 
Consider the following types of hazard mitigation activities: hazard awareness; land use regulation; 
incentives; structural mitigation; and public facilities and infrastructure. Note: please include any 
ordinances/bylaws related to hazard mitigation (for example, restrictions on development in 
hazard areas) that are currently in force, regardless of when they were adopted.  
 
4. What hazard mitigation activities are formally planned to be implemented in the next five years 
in your jurisdiction? Consider projects in planning stages and/or listed in an adopted hazard 
mitigation or emergency preparedness plan.  
 
5. a) Approximately what percent of your jurisdiction’s total budget is dedicated to emergency 
management? 
 
b) Approximately what percent of your jurisdiction’s total budget is dedicated to hazard mitigation?   
 
Part II 
Based on your experience as an emergency management professional: 
 
6. Should the federal and/or the provincial government be more or less involved in local emergency 
management in general and, specifically, in hazard mitigation? Why and, if applicable, how?  
 
7. How important is hazard mitigation in your community in relation to other emergency 
management activities, such as preparedness, response (planning) and recovery? How much 
attention (staff time) and funding does mitigation receive relative to these other functions?  
 
8. Describe the attitudes of local officials toward hazard mitigation, including attitudes toward 
funding mitigation measures and their degree of support for policies that limit development in 
hazard areas (eg. floodplains, steep slopes, earthquake fault zones).  
     
9. Describe the attitudes of the general public in your jurisdiction toward hazard mitigation.  
 
10. Does your jurisdiction exceed the federal and provincial minimum requirements for hazard 
mitigation? Why or why not?  
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A P P E N D I X  I I  
CASE STUDIES: MITIGATION MEASURES IMPLEMENTED 
A. Richmond, B.C. 
Acquisition and Elevation 
1. The city public works department has elevated publicly owned structures, but has not 
acquired private land or structures. 
Awareness/Knowledge 
1. First, hazard assessment tools were used to complete a seismic soil and building evaluation 
of the city in partnership with the University of British Columbia.   
2. Second, risk assessment data is continuously collected and updated from river height 
measurement equipment in the Fraser River, as well as temperature sensors throughout the 
region that warn of severe weather.  
3. Third, city council has approved the installation of a telephone-based disaster warning 
system, which is scheduled to become operational in the spring of 2011.  
4. Fourth, educational awareness is promoted through presentations and informational 
displays by the emergency management department, and through interagency participation 
in the annual Emergency Preparedness Week. Emergency management presentations 
regularly encourage insurance purchase.  
5. Finally, in keeping with their emergency response focus, the city provides staff with 
personal preparedness and response training and resources, some of which may touch on 
mitigation in a secondary manner.  
Coordination 
1. Horizontal coordination is evidenced by mutual aid agreements for fire and public works 
between all communities in British Columbia’s Lower Mainland.  
2. The provincial requirement that community OCPs explicitly address their integration with 
regional plans leads to some degree of vertical coordination, such as the integration of 
environmental goals in the Richmond OCP (1999) and the GVRD Livable Region Strategic 
Plan.  
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Incentives  
1. Procter (2011) was unaware of any incentive programs for hazard mitigation in the City of 
Richmond.  
Development Regulations 
1. The development regulations that city enforces include: 
a.  building standards (National Building Code of Canada), 
b.  floodplain management regulations in for form of flood construction standards, and 
c.  freeboard requirements, which relate specifically to dyke construction and 
maintenance.  
2. The National Building Code of Canada includes seismic construction standards and requires 
that non-conforming buildings be brought up to code whenever permits are granted for 
major renovation/alteration. As renovations are made to existing public buildings, they are 
being retrofitted to meet seismic requirements. 
3.  Also, while land use planning may not be very effective for most hazards in Richmond, the 
city does use land use and development regulations to mitigate the (potentially hazardous) 
nuisance of airport noise by designating certain zones inadmissible for noise sensitive uses 
such as schools and residences (City of Richmond, 1999).   
Financial Assistance 
1. Mitigation projects in Richmond are funded almost exclusively by provincial and federal 
grants.  
Preparedness/Response 
1. The city maintains a commercial radio frequency and equips staff with personal radio 
communication devices.  
2. City staff updates the emergency response plans, including evacuation plans, annually and 
maintains an Emergency Social Services Plan that outlines arrangements for providing 
emergency services, such as food and shelter, in the event of a disaster.  
3. The city trains citizen volunteers in the City’s Emergency Management Program.  
Protection of Public Facilities 
1. Public buildings are brought up to code through seismic retrofits whenever significant 
renovations are completed, as required by the National Building Code of Canada.  
2. The OCP (1999) includes policies related to the siting of public infrastructure and facilities, 
but these are related to urban form rather than hazard concerns.  
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Recovery Measures 
1. The City of Richmond encourages businesses to prepare disaster recovery plans and has 
published a “Business Disaster Response Recovery Guide” to assist the public..  
Structural Controls 
1. 49 km of dykes protect three islands. Plans are in place to incrementally increase the height 
of these dykes in response to the threat of climate change (Procter, 2011).  
2. The city maintains a number of pump stations that are used to pump water out of the city’s 
ditches in advance of a storm, which enables stormwater infrastructure to accommodate a 
greater runoff volume without flooding. 
B. Everett, WA 
Acquisition and Elevation 
The City of Everett does not engage in acquisition of repetitive loss structures or properties. 
Most residential property is at a high enough elevation that elevation of structures is not 
required. 
Awareness/Knowledge 
1. Used a variety of outreach methods to encourage residents to equip themselves with 72-
hour kits 
2. Encouraged and facilitated residential water heater anchoring (ongoing) 
3. Developed and implemented an integrated outreach program to inform residents 
on hazard mitigation measures. 
1. City outreach and education coordinator conducts workshops and presentations about 
mitigation and preparedness and organizes volunteer groups and networks for sharing 
information   
4. Developed a Reverse 911 system for Everett residents 
5. In progress: developing a new traffic control and monitoring system to coordinate response 
and evacuation efforts (for example using traffic signal prioritization during emergency 
response or facilitate evacuation) 
6. Planned: Identify, prioritize, and provide information to homeowners about seismically 
retrofitting  vulnerable residential structures 
7. Planned: Reevaluate response and evacuation routes 
 
Coordination 
1. Internal: Develop and implement a citywide, standardized city-employee identification 
system 
2. Internal: Monthly liaison meetings with representatives from all agencies – functions like an 
internal emergency management committee.  
system (ongoing improvements) 
3. Horizontal Coordination: Mutual aid agreements with adjacent jurisdictions for fire and 
public works 
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4. Vertical: Incorporated county, state, and federal hazard identification and assessment data 
into local plans. For example, incorporation of new USGS data on fault lines   
5. Vertical: Work with county, state emergency management, and FEMA throughout the 
hazard mitigation planning process 
6. Planned: State developing intra-state emergency management mutual aid agreement (in 
progress) 
Incentives 
1. The voluntary retrofitting of private structures is incentivized through the City’s Housing 
Improvement Program.  
Development Regulations 
1. Developed a steep slope mitigation program (identification, public education, stabilization 
measures, setback and development requirements) 
2. Floodplain regulations are administered by the planning department 
3. The City has a two foot freeboard requirement. 
Financial Assistance 
1. City contributed 25% and state and federal grants 75% to a mitigation plan update process 
and to seismically retrofit the Fire Department headquarters 
2. City budgets funds for mitigation and emergency management planning and administration 
Preparedness/Response 
1. Provide for reliable and redundant electrical service capability to selected 
water pump stations 
2. Provide for reliable and redundant electrical service capability to selected 
sewer lift stations 
3. Adopted water pipe repair and new construction practices, improving 
system reliability, and reducing the potential of service interruption due to hazard 
events 
4. Increased the City of Everett’s capacity for delivering water to areas of 
interrupted water service and targeted, vulnerable populations 
5. Train and maintain a CERT program 
6. Conducted a one-week earthquake scenario exercise as part of the City’s overall Training 
and Exercise Program 
7. Snohomish County Public Utility District runs power line debris removal/mitigation  
program 
8. Parks Department is responsible for maintaining the capacity to establish emergency 
shelters for emergency worker rehabilitation and as a last resort for the public. Public 
works provides water and drills regularly. 
 
Protection of Public Facilities 
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1. Assessed vulnerability of City of Everett owned bridges and street segments and establish 
retrofit priorities.  
2. Assessed the structural vulnerability of City of Everett owned buildings and establish 
retrofit priorities (some completed 2006-2011, some planned/ongoing). 
3. Assessed and reduce non-structural vulnerabilities within City of Everett 
operated facilities (some completed 2006-2011, some planned/ongoing) 
4. Warehouse appropriate pipe sections and couplings at strategic locations for repair of the 
aboveground portions of the water transmission lines 
5. Planned: Provide for the continuous and increased monitoring of critical city 
infrastructure, facilities and new construction 
 
Recovery Measures 
1. Emergency provisions allow for temporary moratoria post-disaster, as well as post-disaster 
capital improvements adjustment 
2. Planned: continuity of operations planning (in progress)  
3. Planned: undertake a comprehensive recovery planning process  
 
Structural Controls 
1. Snohomish River has levees on it, but they are maintained by County Dyking and Levee 
Districts 
2. Beach nourishment was used to re-establish historic beach profiles and the USACE 
nourishes an island beach that has protective capabilities for the Everett waterfront. 
3. A Public Works project is currently building dykes along Snohomish River 
4. Planned: separate stormwater and sewerage systems to prevent treatment plant from being 
overwhelmed  
C. Port Alberni, B.C.  
Acquisition and Elevation 
1. A few flood-prone properties have been acquired, but none in the last 10 years due to 
financial constraints (Smith, 2011) 
Awareness/Knowledge 
1. A wildfire urban interface study has been completed.  
2. A tsunami warning system is operated and tested monthly by the fire department. 
3. The regional district emergency planning coordinator promotes hazard awareness through 
educational talks and displays at schools and other community events. 
4. The City posts and maintains signs marking the tsunami hazard area 
 
Coordination 
1. The City of Port Alberni maintains an up to date Official Community Plan that includes a 
discussion of natural hazards (Port Alberni, 2007). 
2. A region-wide Official Community Plan is created and maintained by the Alberni-Clayoquot 
Regional District. 
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3. Informal internal and horizontal coordination is ongoing because of the small City staff and 
close relationship with surrounding municipalities (Smith, 2011). 
4. Regular emergency response planning happens in coordination with the Provincial 
Emergency Program and the Regional District.  
 
Incentives 
1. There are no incentive programs in place at this time (Smith, 2011).   
Development Regulations 
1. Port Alberni enforces the B.C. National Building Code standards. 
2. The City of Port Alberni Floodplain Bylaw (NO. 4288) requires all new construction in the 
floodplain to be built to a specified geodetic survey height (3.65m/12.0ft).  
3. A 50 foot setback is required from all creeks in Port Alberni.  
4. While no explicit regulation exists, it is unofficially recognized that subdivision approvals 
will not be granted for development projects in the floodplain or other known hazard areas 
in Port Alberni (Smith, 2011). 
5. Onsite retention of stormwater is required for all new development to prevent the 
exacerbation of urban flooding. 
 
Financial Assistance 
1. Most hazard mitigation projects rely on provincial and federal grants with local matching 
funds. Most projects are done on a cost-share basis with 1/3 federal, 1/3 provincial, and 1/3 
local funds. 
Preparedness/Response 
1. An emergency response plan is maintained by the city’s Emergency Planning Coordinator  
2. The City’s Tsunami Floodplain Management Strategy includes evacuation planning. 
 
Protection of Public Facilities 
1. The aging Highway 4 was rebuilt as a structural dyke after the tsunami event of 1964. 
2. New buildings have been built up to code for the fire department and RCMP. 
3.  A new high school was after earthquake simulations revealed the vulnerability of the 
earlier structure. 
4. As with subdivision regulation, the siting of public facilities informally considers the 
location of hazard areas, though there is no formal process for their consideration (Smith, 
2011). 
 
Recovery Measures 
1. Smith (2011) was not aware of any recovery-related mitigation measures. 
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Structural Controls 
1. The Highway 4 structural dyke is maintained by the Province of B.C. 
 
D. Mountlake Terrace, WA 
Acquisition and Elevation 
1. One repetitive loss property downstream of the Cedar Way Dam was acquired and razed 
and the property was rezoned “Parks and Recreation.” 
2. Goal to “develop acquisition and management strategies to preserve open space for flood 
mitigation, fish habitat, and water quality in the floodplain” within 5 years– reliant upon 
state or federal funding programs, like the HMGP (Mountlake Terrace, 2010, 267) 
Awareness/Knowledge 
1. The city plans to improve land use decisions and reduce repetitive losses by upgrading GIS 
capability and incorporating HAZUS software within 2 years (Mountlake Terrace, 2010). 
2. They also plan to “educate consumers about drought impacts and ways to minimize water 
waste” through brochures, “conservation kits” and education programs in schools on an 
ongoing basis (Mountlake Terrace, 2010). 
Coordination 
1. Encouraging inter-jurisdiction and inter-agency coordination is one of the goals of the 
Multi-jurisdiction Hazard Mitigation Plan (2004). 
Incentives 
No incentives are mentioned in the 2010 update to the Hazard Mitigation Plan. 
Development Regulations 
1. Prior to development, the city requires geotechnical studies under the City’s environmental 
regulations.  
2. Building must conform to the 2006 International Building Code and include best 
management practices.   
3. Residences are not located along Lake Ballinger. All lakeside property is parks and a golf 
course and residences are located on higher ground.  
4. They plan to revisit floodplain regulations and possibly update elevation requirements and 
critical area designations within 5 years (Mountlake Terrace, 2010). 
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5. They plan to review development regulations and subdivision design guidelines to improve 
the protection of landslide-prone slopes within 1 year and on an ongoing basis (Mountlake 
Terrace, 2010) 
Ordinances: 
6. MTMC 15.05.260 Protection of Natural Water Courses (Ordinance 2453, Adopted 2007) – 
“protects and preserves natural watercourses as a major element of the City’s surface water 
drainage system (Mountlake Terrace, 2010) 
7. MTMC 16.05 State Environmental Protection Act – City Environmental Policy (Ordinances 
2480, 1575 & 2114, Adopted 1982, updated 1984 & 1996) – “procedures and policies to 
improve and coordinate plans, functions, programs, and resources consistent with state and 
county policies for environmental protection” (Mountlake Terrace, 2010) 
8. MTMC 16.10 Shorelines Management Act (Ordinance 993, Adopted 1992, update planned 
for 2011)  
9. MTMC 16.15 Establishing and Defining Sensitive Areas (Ordinance 2370, Adopted 2004, 
update planned for 2011) – “Protects the public from damages from landslides, subsidence 
erosion and flooding” (Mountlake Terrace, 2010) 
Financial Assistance 
1. Capital improvement planning is in place to address deficiencies in infrastructure and 
public works 
2. Development fees fund building code enforcement 
Preparedness/Response 
1.  The city recently upgraded to regional 800 MHz communications system to enhance 
emergency communications 
2. The city works with private utilities to prevent damage to power and telephone lines from 
trees 
Protection of Public Facilities 
1. After the Nisqually Earthquake in 2001, two freestanding canopies – one at City Hall, the 
other on a public works building, were determined to be at risk of failure in a future 
earthquake and were removed.  
2. Seismic retrofits to two water towers and construction of one new one to code standards.  
3. Plans are in place to replace city hall with a new, up to code, structure within two years 
(Mountlake Terrace, 2010). 
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Recovery Measures 
The Hazard Mitigation Plan does not mention any mitigation efforts aimed at recovery 
measures. 
Structural Controls 
1. Lyon Creek was realigned to address erosion problems and protect infrastructure 
2. Three culverts were added and the lake level control weir on Lake Ballinger to 
reconstructed  
3. A storm drain capital improvement project was implemented in 2006 
4. Reconstruction and slope stabilization was implemented in landslide-prone areas 
5. The city plans to identify and address urban stormwater drainage problems within 4-6 
years (Mountlake Terrace, 2010). 
 
